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 3 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The financial crisis that broke out in September 2008 in the United States of 
America (US) has upset the world economy by means of chain reactions, hence 
causing global recession. The turmoil emerged in the finance sector, but swiftly has 
grasped the real economy, thus throwing the global economy into a recession 
reminiscent of the 1929 Great Depression. The industrialised countries were the 
hardest hit at the beginning; but the damages have turned out to be heavier for 
developing countries. The European Union (EU), the largest market of the world, 
naturally has not gone unaffected. Stock markets fell; and major banks collapsed in 
the established member states within two weeks time. The crisis then has diffused 
into the poorer new member states of the EU, engendering nefarious impacts therein. 
As such, the EU did not miss the global pattern. There were concerns in the EU that 
the situation would be the worst since the end of World War II. 
 
This thesis is an attempt to reveal the implications of the crisis in the EU 
context. In that, the objective is to study what sort of problems the crisis has 
generated in the member states’ polities, and what have been the impacts of domestic 
implications on the EU’s multilevel governance. This thesis proposes that the EU’s 
response to the crisis was multifaceted with some nationalist reactions. The thesis 
also questions the domestic impact of the crisis on EU governance. The research 
question derives from the EU’s claim to be the largest market and one of the strongest 
economic actors of the world economy. The strongest foothold of European 
integration has so far been economic integration, specifically the first pillar. In 
addition, economic integration is the earliest and the most progressed area of 
integration. Therefore, the intuition is, and the EU claims, that integration should be 
the most solid, and solidarity should to the firmest, if it is ever to be, in economic area 
than elsewhere. This thesis aims to test the validity of this claim at the face of the 
2008 financial crisis. Crises, per se, are phenomena that pose challenges of an 
unexpected and devastating nature. Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that 
they cause damages whenever and wherever they arouse. Accordingly, the assertion 
that a crisis would create nefarious consequences in a given system is not too startling 
a finding. However, crises also are of a nature that exposes the already existing 
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vulnerabilities. Therefore, their study is valuable to pinpoint the strengths and 
weakness of a given system. This is the reason why this thesis argues that the 2008 
crisis provides a valuable occasion to test the solidity of economic integration and 
solidarity within the Union. The choice of the crisis as a subject of study also is 
appropriate because of its timing; the crisis has come about shortly after the EU 
finalised its last two waves of enlargement. It is worth reminding that the 2004 and 
2007 enlargements brought in the emerging and developing Central and Eastern 
European economies, mostly in transition. The EU has been arguing that the 
enlargements, notwithstanding the additional difficulties that they have brought in the 
Union’s functioning, had been smooth and on their way of settling, and that the 
collective decision making was going mostly well, in a spirit of unity and solidarity 
between the old and new members. This thesis aims to elaborate on the veracity of 
this claim in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, and thereby, on the broader issue of 
integration. In so doing, this thesis aims to contribute to the existing literature on EU 
integration, as well as to the larger literature on International Relations. In that, the 
success of economic integration in its depth and scope has so far been the 
unassailable argument of the functionalist approaches to European integration; since, 
therein the community rule applied in its strongest fashion. Furthermore, economic 
integration also has been a pondering argument of the sociological approaches; 
because in no other area has the experience with integration outlasted the experience 
of building the single market. The EU’s experience with economic integration for 
more than 50 years would incite the intuition that if sort of a common spirit is ever to 
emerge, it must emerge under the first pillar. Thus, in a way, by testing the solidity of 
EU solidarity and market integration, this thesis envisages contributing to the debates 
on EU integration. The impact of the crisis is important as a result to assess the 
relative strength of economic integration in the EU. In addition, measuring EU 
solidarity and the strength of market integration versus state interests also contributes 
to the debate on the predominance of state and its interests in the literature on 
International Relations. 
 
The thesis is structured in three sections. The first section focuses on the EU 
level; and examines the various actions to counter the turmoil by state actors and the 
Commission in the period from the advent of the crisis to the European Council (EC) 
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meeting of March 20, 2009. The objective is to identify whether and if so, the extent 
to which the actors developed a common EU strategy in fighting the crisis. The 
second and the third parts concentrate on the context of Central and Eastern Europe, 
in an attempt to see whether the turmoil has engendered heavier implications in the 
new member states, and if so of what sort. The second section focuses on the 
macroeconomic impacts of the crisis, while the last part elaborates on the social 
impacts of the crisis. The analysis covers the period from September 2008, the month 
in which the crisis broke out, to March/April 2009 meaning the days around of the EC 
meeting of March 20, 2009. The research materials to this thesis are official 
documents and reports by the EU, and by other international institutions such as the 
IMF, the World Bank etc., as well as the media reports, articles and dossiers. It is 
hypothesised that the EU’s solidarity is vulnerable to the individual interests of the 
member states, and more precisely those of the older members, and particularly of 
Germany, Italy, France and Britain. 
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Chapter II:  
THE EUROPEAN UNION’ AND ITS MEMBER STATES’ 
RESPONSES TO THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS  
This chapter examines the impacts of the financial crisis of 2008 over EU 
economies and the ways in which the member states and the Commission have 
attempted to counter the damages. The analysis covers the period from September 
2008, marking the outbreak of the crisis, to the end of March 2009 when the 
European Council (EC) of March 19-20, 2009 took place. The objective is to identify 
the interests pursued by the Commission and member states, what sort of a strategy, 
these actors have defined, and the extent to which this strategy has proved successful. 
The choice of these actors draws on the following reason. The Commission incarnates 
the integrationist force in the Union; it defends the Community interests and detains 
the right to initiate a legal action. On the other hand, the Council and the EC are the 
instances that channel state interests. While the EC defines the main orientations and 
constitutes the ultimate venue for interstate debates, the Council is a legislative body 
that corrects, when needed, the Commission’s directives. So, by choosing these 
actors, this thesis aims to understand the interaction between the integrationist drives 
and state interests, thereby to comprehend whether the integration force can 
counterbalance state actors. The chapter is structured in two sections. The first part 
analyses the EU level actions and measures to counter the crisis. In that, the study 
begins with the immediate impacts of the crisis over European economies, proceeds 
with the phase of development of EU level actions, and ends by an examination of the 
implementation period. The second part evaluates the relevance of the Union’s crisis 
management strategy for the EU’s functioning. The chapter follows a chronological 
approach so to trace the process down, thereby to pinpoint coalition patterns between 
EU actors. The research materials encompass official documents, media reports and 
articles.  
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II. I. The Outbreak of the Crisis 
 
This section analyses the period following the outbreak of the crisis. It aims to 
identify how the crisis has gained Europe and what sort of damages it has made. In so 
doing, the objective is to track down the immediate reactions by EU actors. In order 
to fully comprehend the impacts of the crisis, it is necessary to provide some 
background information.  
 
Although it is possible to trace back the crisis till the beginning of 2008, this 
thesis takes as the starting point of the crisis September 12, 2008 when Lehman 
Brothers, the fourth largest investment bank in the US, averred that they were facing a 
collapse. On September 15, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, while Merrill 
Lynch, another leading investment bank, and AIG, an insurance company, declared 
that they sought rescue. Following these declarations, US stock markets crashed; the 
crisis gained other institutions and sectors in the country.  
 
The crisis spread over other regions of the world through economic interlinks. 
On September 16, Asian markets plummeted; Russia closed its stock markets. On 
September 18, Indian markets experienced intense fluctuations. In Europe, Britain’s 
biggest mortgage lender, the HBOS collapsed. As panic gained citizens, shares 
plummeted on the London Stock Market; and some leading companies, such as 
Lloyds TSB and HBOS, launched merger talks. The divulgement of HBOS takeover 
enkindled the fear of job cuts in Britain. British banks pressured on Bank of England 
for an extension of the liquidity scheme.1 In response to these developments, the 
ECB, the Bank of Japan, the Swiss National Bank, the Bank of Canada and the Bank 
of England collectively decided to provide extra funding in short-term US dollar 
markets. The FED lent money to the central banks in Europe, Asia and North 
America in an attempt to prevent liquidity shortage.2 In coordination with the FED; 
the ECB “increased the amount of US dollar liquidity provided to the counterparties 
                                                 
1 Liquidity scheme allows banks to deposit assets for which there is little market, such as mortgage-backed 
securities, in return for Treasury bills, which are gold-plated and used as a source of funding. Seager, Ashley, 
“King forced into U-turn with extension of liquidity scheme”, The Guardian, the official website, 17.09.2008, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/sep/18/bankofenglandgovernor.banking, 19.01.2008. 
2 Elliott, Larry, “Banking crisis: Central banks pump billions in to ease the strain”, The Guardian, the official 
website, 18.09.2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/sep/18/marketturmoil1, 19.01.2008. 
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of the Eurosystem for the 28-days maturity operations.”3 These initiatives yet, failed 
to attenuate panic on markets. The stock exchanges kept falling both in Britain, and 
the US. In response to that phenomenon, Britain’s Financial Services Authority 
announced a ban on the short-selling of bank shares; and the FED mentioned a plan to 
create a federal entity to clear the mortgage-related debts. 4  Next, the US 
administration declared that it prepared a bailout plan of $700 billion. In short, state 
actors attempted to restore confidence in the markets by monetary supply. The central 
banks of various regions, including the ECB cooperated for liquidity provision. 
However, such confidence building measures could only partly assuage markets in 
Asia, the US and Britain because panic had grasped people.  
 
Of the various moves by the world’s financial actors, the one on which all 
financial institutions focused was the US bailout plan. The US administration tried 
hard to convince the Congress in favour of the plan; but the elite opinion was turning 
against the proposal. Both presidential candidates, Barack Obama and John McCain 
decried the plan on the grounds that it would offer a “blank cheque for the US 
treasury to buy up debt”.5 Following the failure of the voting, major firms in Britain 
augmented job cuts; Ireland fell into recession; and the Commission reported that 
Germany and Spain risked going through recession as well.6 To put it in another way, 
the developments in the US have unsettled Europe regardless of what EU actors did.  
 
The French president and the current EU term president Nicolas Sarkozy called 
for a world leaders summit to discuss the crisis. Upon this initiative, a G7 meeting 
was convened on September 22. The leaders concluded on the following points:7 1. 
Commitment to the integrity of the international financial system and to facilitate 
functioning of markets; 2. Support to the US program on removing illiquid assets that 
                                                 
3 European Central Bank, “Measures designed to address elevated pressures in the short-term US dollar funding 
markets”, Press Release, 18.09.2008, the official website, 
http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2008/html/pr080918.en.html, 20.01.2009. 
4 Clark, Andrew, “Wall Street: US government taking steps to clean up mortgage-related debt”, The Guardian, the 
official website, 18.09.2008,  http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/sep/18/wallstreet.subprimecrisis,  
19.01.2008. 
5 Burkeman, Oliver, “US election briefing: Unity breaks out against Bush bailout”, The Guardian, the official 
website, 18.09.2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/sep/23/uselections2008.barackobama1, 19.01.2008. 
6  Kollewe, Julia, “Ireland falls into recession”, The Guardian, the official website, 25.09.2008, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/sep/25/recession.ireland, 19.01.2008.  
7 European Central Bank, “Statement by G-7 finance ministers and central bank governors on global financial 
market turmoil”, Press Release, 22.09.2008, the official website, 
http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2008/html/pr080922.en.html, 20.01.2009. 
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destabilise financial institutions; 3. Call on other G7 countries to take similar 
measures; 4. Commitment to full and rapid implementation of the Financial Stability 
Forum (FSF) recommendations to enhance the resilience of the global financial 
system for the longer term; 5. Enhancing international cooperation between finance 
ministries, central banks and regulators.  
 
The state of affairs in Europe was not brilliant. Britain was going through 
particularly hard times; the Prime Minister (PM) Gordon Brown contacted world 
leaders to develop a coordinated action plan. On September 26, Brown addressed the 
UN General Assembly, and advocated for new systems of international regulation of 
the major global financial players, as well as called on the leaders to be cooperative, 
responsible and consistent with the rules. 8  The events, on the following days, 
corroborated the significance of Brown’s messages. Apple plummeted in US markets, 
and Bradford & Bingley shares fell in Britain. These drops engendered the fear of job 
loss amongst people. Britain nationalised Bradford & Bingley, while Spain’s 
Santander bought Bradford & Bingley’s 200 branches.  
 
On September 30, then US President George W. Bush submitted the bailout 
plan to the US House of Representatives. Despite lobbying, US House declined the 
bill. This rejection triggered a crash on global stock markets, and bank collapses in 
various regions of the world. As regards Europe, the failure of the voting aborted the 
ECB’s initiative to conduct a special term refinancing operation to improve the 
liquidity position of the Eurozone banking system.9  Also, major European banks 
successively began falling: The Belgian-Dutch financial group Fortis declared that 
they were looking for a rescue partner. Belgian, Luxemburger and Dutch 
governments agreed on a rescue plan for Fortis. Dexia, the Belgian-French municipal 
lender, collapsed. Royal Bank of Scotland shares lost half their values. The Irish 
government decided to guarantee the retail deposits for the next two years. In Iceland, 
the government took control of the major banks in the country. Germany launched a 
rescue plan for banks in vulnerable situation. President Sarkozy summoned the 
                                                 
8 Brown’s plan envisaged a financial stability forum to be built on five principles of transparency, including sound 
banking practice, responsibility, integrity and global regulation. Wintour, Patrick, “Gordon Brown calls for end to 
'age of irresponsibility' in UN speech”, The Guardian, the official website, 26.09.2008, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2008/sep/26/gordonbrown.economics, 19.01.2008. 
9 European Central Bank, “Conduct of a special term refinancing operation”, Press Release, the official website, 
29.09.2008, http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2008/html/pr080929.en.html, 20.01.2009. 
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leaders of the major banks in France. Central banks increased monetary supply to 
distress the system. But, the successive bank collapses had instigated the fear amongst 
people about which bank would be the next to fall. Therefore, the interbank lending 
rate peaked despite efforts to control panic. On the real economy side, firms, such as 
Miss Sixty, fell down; UK car firms reduced the working hours. Car companies in 
France cut jobs. Fears about unemployment escalated; which led employees to go on 
strike across Europe.  
 
The crisis that emerged in the banking sector in the US diffused into European 
economies due to the interconnectedness of the financial and banking systems.10 On 
the other hand, a number of other factors contributed to the crisis. 11  Of the 
macroeconomic causes, ample liquidity, low interest rates, and the loose monetary 
policy in the US, accumulation of large global imbalances, and mispricing of risk and 
large increases in leverage account for destabilisation. Secondly, firms, supervisors, 
and regulators showed poor performance in risk management. The lack of 
transparency in turn, has led to the emergence of a shadow banking system, and has 
introduced an extreme complexity into system, which only a restricted number of 
people could understand. Thirdly, credit rating agencies failed in the ratings of 
structured products, and major conflicts of interests impeded the system. Fourthly, 
corporate governance was problematic; weak shareholders often mismanaged firms; 
and remuneration schemes have given wrong incentives. Fifthly, regulation and 
supervision mechanisms have underperformed; they have underestimated or 
misjudged macroprudential risk; derivatives markets were not regulated. Finally, 
global financial institutions such as the IMF, the FSF or G20 have remained weak due 
to the lack of coordination. 
 
In sum, in a short period of time, the financial crisis originated in the US gained 
momentum in Europe, through the interconnectedness of the banking system. The 
Eurozone countries received the immediate impacts, because their banking systems 
were more developed and more integrated in the international financial system. In this 
period, major European banks collapsed one after another; most Eurozone 
                                                 
10  Schor, Elana, “Wall Street crisis spreads through Europe's banks”, The Guardian, the official website, 
30.09.2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/sep/30/banking.europeanbanks, 19.01.2008. 
11  European Commission, Brief Summary of the Larosiere Report, 25.02.2009, the official website,  
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication14529_en.pdf.  
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governments nationalised ailing institutions; stock exchanges plummeted; and firms 
began closing off. As panic dominated European societies, social discontent 
escalated, despite government efforts to circumvent it. State actors initially turned to 
unilateral solutions such as liquidity provision. But, they also sought cooperation and 
coordination at the global level, knowing that individual strategies were unlikely to 
prove successful in economic interdependency. “Europe’s high level of economic and 
financial integration called for strong coordination of public policies.”12 Furthermore, 
independent financial authorities tried to coordinate their actions. The ECB 
cooperated with the FED and other central banks in an effort to control liquidity 
shortage. One striking point in the process was that all global financial actors, 
including the European ones, proved to be dependent on decisions taken in the US. In 
other words, the US continues to be the most influential actor in the international 
system. That the failure of the US bailout plan aborted ECB measures, caused stock 
market crashes and successive bank collapses in Europe show that the EU was not yet 
as powerful an actor as it aspires to become. So, this part examined the immediate 
impacts of the crisis over Europe. The next section dwells upon the Commission and 
the state actors’ efforts to develop a common action, and to maintain its solidarity.  
 
II. II. ACTING TOGETHER AND IN SOLIDARITY 
 
This section elaborates the period in which EU actors set about to develop a 
common action plan. The analysis covers the period from October to December 2008. 
The objective is to pinpoint the priorities of EU actors in dealing with the crisis, 
hence the sort of measures they decided to take. 
 
In the EU, the attempts to take collective action began in October 2008. On 
October 1, the Commission proposed a revision of rules on bank capital requirements, 
the restriction of the ceiling of bank lending, the establishment of national 
supervisory authorities to overview the activities of cross-border banking groups in an 
effort to restore confidence in the financial markets.13 On October 2, the Commission 
                                                 
12 Zoli, Edda, “Europe Battles a Deep Recession”, IMF Survey Magazine, Countries & Regions, the IMF official 
website, 12.05.2009, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2009/CAR051209A.htm 
13 European Commission, “Commission puts forward a revision of rules on bank capital requirements”, the official 
website, 1.10.2008, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/thematic_articles/article13203_en.htm, 21.01.2009.  
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tightened the rules to safeguard European banks from meltdown. On the other hand, 
the major problem in the markets pertained to liquidity shortage. Therefore, 
Commission President Barroso discussed with EU President Sarkozy the “EU bailout 
plan”. Following this initiative, President Sarkozy invited Britain, Germany and Italy 
for emergency talks in Paris on October 4, 2008. Besides conveying solidarity 
messages and calling for common action, the four leaders agreed on providing €300 
billion of aid to ailing small businesses across the EU.14 The four also called for a 
global economic summit that would convene the G8 leaders, plus China, India, South 
Africa, Brazil and Mexico.15 The decisions taken at the emergency talks then entered 
the agenda of the Ecofin council of October 6-7. The ministers established that 
“member states were facing common shocks” (despite disparate effects on the 
economies and across groups); therefore, the Community needed to develop a 
common action plan.16 The ministers agreed to support growth and monetary policy, 
reduce inflation thereby protect the purchasing power, restore confidence on financial 
markets through full implementation of the October 2007 roadmap, avoid excessive 
tightening of credit toward SMEs, and be proactive in the international arena.17 So, 
the EU’s strategy towards the financial system consisted of increasing transparency in 
the banking sector, enhancing retail deposit guarantee protection and providing 
liquidity. As regards the real economy, the EU aimed to lessen social costs through 
demand stimulation and growth policies. These initiatives established the basis to the 
succeeding actions. It is noteworthy that the guidelines defined by the four members, 
France, Britain, Germany and Italy, influenced the outcome of the Ecofin meeting.  
 
To ensure the appropriate liquidity conditions for financial institutions, 
European central banks immediately cut interest rates on October 8. Also, the 
Commission established a high-level group, Larosière group, to set the principles of 
an effective supervision for global financial institutions. The EU level measures 
however, did not suffice to rectify economy. Therefore, the heads of state of the 
Eurozone countries again convened at an emergency meeting on October 12. 
Reaffirming the need for enhancing cooperation procedures amongst member states, 
                                                 
14 Helm, Toby, “Europe calls for global summit on bank crisis”, The Guardian, the official website, 04.10.2008, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2008/oct/04/paris.economy, 20.01.09.  
15 ibid.  
16  European Commission, Bulletin “EU-10-2008 (en) 1.7.6.”, the official website, 
http://europa.eu/bulletin/en/200810/p107006.htm, 20.01.2009.  
17 ibid.  
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the leaders agreed to provide liquidity to ailing financial institutions, state aids so to 
speak. This strategy encompassed provision of additional capital resources, 
recapitalisation of distressed banks, and simplification of the funding of banks.18 To 
ensure flexibility in the implementation of accounting rules, the leaders invited the 
Commission to apply flexibility in state aid decisions.  
 
Following the demand by member states, the Commission issued the 
communication on temporary Community framework for State aid measures on 
October 14. The Commission pursued two objectives in regulating the state aids; to 
unblock bank lending to companies thereby guarantee continuity in their access to 
finance; and to encourage companies to continue investing. Maintaining investment 
was crucial for the sustainable growth objective of the Lisbon Strategy and for 
environmental policies. Halt in investments would be disastrous especially for 
environmental projects, because the Commission had been pushing companies 
through for restructuring of production and plantations, and the EU had been trying to 
arise as a leading actor on the international stage.19 The existing regulation on state 
aids mainly targeted the SMEs, and aimed to assist them in areas such as access to 
finance to R&D, innovation, training, employment, environmental measures. Aids 
were conditioned upon compatibility with the energy and climate change policies. 
Building on this framework, the Commission allowed state aids under the forms of 
guarantees, subsidised interest rate, and production of green products. The aid 
“should not exceed a cash grant of €500 000 per undertaking; it should be granted in 
the form of a scheme to firms which were not in difficulty on 1 July 2008; it may be 
granted to firms that were not in difficulty at that date but entered in difficulty 
thereafter as a result of the global financial and economic crisis. The aid schemes 
would not apply to firms active in the fisheries sector; and the aid would not be used 
as export aid or aid favouring domestic over imported products”.20 In addition, the 
Commission simplified the short-term export credit measures, and the procedure for 
                                                 
18 “Summit of The Euro Area Countries, Declaration on a Concerted European Action Plan of the Euro Area 
Countries”, Economy and Finance Publications, the official website, 12.10.2008, 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication13260_en.pdf, 21.01.2009. 
19  European Commission, “State Aid Control”, the official website, 13.10.2008, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/horizontal.html, 21.01.2009. 
20 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission — Temporary Community framework for 
State aid measures to support access to finance in the current financial and economic crisis”, Official Journal of 
the European Union, 22.1.2009, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:016:000 
1:0009:EN:PDF, pp.3-8.  
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rescue packages. Also, the communication defined the measures that would not be 
considered state aid. Measures such as delay in payment deadlines for social security 
and similar tax extension would be in order provided that they applied to all 
companies in and outside the territory.21 State aids posed a challenge to coordination 
and harmony at the EU level; because the crisis, having engendered impacts at 
different degrees across member states, would lead to different aid packages whose 
implications on competition would be hard to control. Accordingly, the Commission 
had greater responsibility to ensure coherence between national action and European 
action, and especially coherence between actions by Eurozone members and by those 
outside it.22 In other words, this measure increased the Commission’s supervisory 
role; and underlined the need for a stronger Commission.  
 
On October 15, the Commission tackled the problem of depositors’ confidence 
in European banks. In that, depositors were unsure that their money would be 
adequately protected if their bank failed. Such a guarantee in fact, existed up to at 
least €20 000 within the framework of the Directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes. 
But the ceiling was not high enough to assuage depositors’ worries, since it allowed 
member states to cover only 90% of savings. The fact that a certain portion of savings 
may not be covered, added to uncertainty. Besides, the payouts would be released 
within three months time, whereas even a week could be detrimental for firms in the 
context of crisis. Hence, the Commission proposal increased this ceiling to €100,000; 
ensured the totality of deposits would be reimbursed up to the coverage level; and 
reduced the payout delay to three days.23  
 
The EC of 15-16 October adopted the Commission’s state aid plan and 
measures on banking sector. It also welcomed measures concerning the accounting 
standards, and the establishment of an informal warning information-exchange and 
                                                 
21 ibid. 
22  Barroso, José M.D., President of the Commission, “Creating a European Response to a Global Crisis”, 
European Parliament of Enterprises, Brussels, 14 October 2008, EU press releases, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/08/525&format=HTML&aged=0&language=
EN&guiLanguage=en, 21.01.2009.  
23 The proposal suggested revision to EU rules on deposit guarantee schemes in accordance with the decision 
taken at the Ecofin on 7 October 2008. European Commission, “Proposal on Amendment of the Directive on 
Deposit Guarantee Schemes”, the official website, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/guarantee/citsum_en.pdf, 21.01.2009. 
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evaluation mechanism.24 Thereupon, governments immediately set to design rescue 
packages. On October 16, Germany, France, Austria and Spain made rescue packages 
of, approximately, €2 trillion. In the following two weeks, Italy, Sweden, Poland, and 
Norway also issued rescue packages. These aids were crucial for domestic problems; 
but they also mattered for EU actors (Britain, France, Italy and Germany in 
particular) because of the latter’s desire to outdo US performance of crisis 
management thereby to demonstrate their grandeur on the international arena. 
President Sarkozy statement that “United Europe has pledged more than the US” 
illustrates the ambition.25 Likewise, pointing at the fact that the US nationalised its 
banks on October 14, days after nationalisations in Europe, Italy’s Unicredit bank 
reported, “European policymakers were racing ahead of the US in their efforts to 
solve the crisis”. 26  To make a recapitulation in passing, the EU has kept to its 
commitment to develop a common action. The term ‘common action’ however, is 
misleading. What the EU has managed to build up is a set of measures with a same 
objective, but whose character depends on domestic needs. Also, the so-far adopted 
measures targeted the Eurozone rather than the non-Eurozone. The concerns of the 
Eurozone countries, particularly those of the four old member states, marked EU level 
strategies, which the decision on state aids to ailing financial institutions and sectors 
demonstrates. That the Eurozone countries were the one that developed rescue 
packages affirms this inference. Finally, the disparate character of state aids increased 
the Commission’s role as the supervisor and coordinator. 
 
As regards the second commitment, the ECB announced the release of €5 
billion loan facility to Hungary on October 16. The ECB’s bailout was 
unprecedented, because Hungary was not a Eurozone member. In so doing, the ECB 
aimed to contain the implications of the crisis in the country; because otherwise, other 
players, such as Austrian banks, which held heavy investments in Hungary, risked 
being affected.  
 
                                                 
24  Council of the European Union, “EC Presidency Conclusions”, 15-16 October 2008, the official website, 
www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/103441.pdf, 20.01.2009. 
25  Traynor, Ian, “EU takes a €2 trillion financial gamble” The Guardian, the official website, 14.10.2008,  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/oct/14/europe-europeanbanks, 20.01.09. 
26 ibid. 
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The EU faced far greater challenges than the US in facing the crisis, because of 
the coordination and monitoring problems. Supervision and regulation at the EU level 
remained inadequate in the crisis context.27 Therefore, the Commission, on October 
29, released a communication on a European framework of action wherein it 
proposed further measures to guarantee deposits, and to supervise operations on the 
financial markets (especially those concerning the derived products and speculative 
funds and funds of capital reinvestment) while stressing the need to redefine the 
structure of regulation and supervision.28 The communication buttressed the necessity 
to respect competition rules, to augment the investments in R&D, and to promote 
environmental friendly sectors. With regards to unemployment, it proposed 
reprogramming the European social funds in an effort to reintegrate workers into job 
market, controlling the impacts of the crisis on the sectors undergoing structural 
adjustments through state aids, and reforming taxation and income support schemes. 
Finally, the Commission asserted the need to pursue international cooperation, 
particularly with regards to restructuring of the global financial system.  
 
Despite measures, European economies could not circumvent the recession risk. 
The British government launched construction plans to boost economy. Nevertheless, 
public finances made an unprecedented deficit; interest rates were cut down; and job 
supply shrank off, hence resulting in the biggest drop in GDP that the British 
economy has made since 1990. In the Netherlands, the ING bank demanded injection 
from national authorities. In Germany and France, job cuts augmented. Besides, the 
crisis produced a domino effect over Eastern Europe. Various countries, such as 
Ukraine, Turkey and Hungary sought loans from the IMF.29 Shares sharply fell in 
Asian markets. The Bank of Japan cut down on interest rates for the first time in 
seven years;30 and the FED further reduced interest rates. Commission forecast for the 
2008-2010 period stated that the nefarious impacts of the crisis would deepen in the 
                                                 
27 Almunia, Joaquín, Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Policy, SPEECH/08/534, “Boosting growth and 
productivity in an open Europe”, DG ECFIN Annual Research Conference - Centre Borschette, Brussels, 
16.10.2008, The EU’s official website, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference 
=SPEECH/08/534&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en, 20.01.2009. 
28  European Commission, “Communication on From financial crisis to recovery: a European framework for 
action”, the official website, http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/president/pdf/ press_20081029_fr.pdf, 
21.01.2009. 
29 Gow, David, “From the Baltic to Turkey, fears grow of domino effect as nations seek rescue”, The Guardian, 
the official website, 28.10.2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/oct/28/creditcrunch-globaleconomy1, 
20.01.2009. 
30 McCurry, Justin, “Japanese interest rates cut for first time in seven years”, The Guardian, the official website, 
31.10.2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/oct/31/globaleconomy-japan, 20.01.2009. 
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real economy. The Commission expected unemployment to rise, and the inflation to 
fall as a result of the tightening purchasing power of households. Rising inflation and 
unemployment would increase pressure on public finances.31 In this gloomy context, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden prepared their state aids by 
the end of October 2008.  Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Spain, Greece, Hungary, Italy, 
Latvia and Luxembourg finalised their support schemes in November. 
 
The Ecofin Council convened on November 4, 2008 to evaluate the economic 
situation. The ministers agreed to strengthen the fight against VAT fraud, to introduce 
a computerised excise duty monitoring system, and to increase the ceiling for 
financial assistance to the balance of payments in the event of financial difficulty of a 
member state. 32 In this vein, the Council decided to grant a loan of €6.5 billion to 
Hungary. The loan was a part of the €12.5 billion assistance package from the IMF 
and €1 billion from the WB. The Council conditioned the assistance on the 
implementation of accompanying measures, the consolidation of the budget and the 
reform of budgetary governance. Hence, by providing assistance to Hungary, the EU 
demonstrated its solidarity. 
 
The Brussels meeting of the heads of states on November 7 confirmed these 
decisions. Moreover, the leaders defined a common position for the incoming G20 
Washington Summit. The EU position covered the following points: international 
regulation to encompass all financial institutions, market segments and jurisdictions; 
the convergence of accounting standards; the establishment of codes of conduct to 
avoid excessive risk-taking in the financial sector, including in the area of systems of 
remuneration; to give the IMF a greater role in restoring confidence and stability; and 
to submit rating agencies to registration, surveillance and rules of governance.33 The 
heads of states also charged the Council and the Commission to submit to the next EC 
meeting a European strategy. One reason underlying the willingness for international 
                                                 
31 European Commission, “European Economy, Economic Forecast”, Autumn 2008, Economic and Financial 
Affairs, the official website, 03.11.2008, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/ 
publication13290_en.pdf, 22.01.09.  
32 Council of the European Union, “2901st Council meeting”, Press Release, 15067/08 (Press 311), Brussels, 04 
.11. 2008, the official website,  
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ecofin/103811.pdf, 20.01.2009. 
33 “Informal meeting of the Heads of States and Government of the European Union on 7 November 2008”,  the 
official website, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/misc/103873.pdf, 
20.01.2009.  
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cooperation was the desire to outdo US leadership in the international arena. Another 
reason was that individual and even EU level strategies would not suffice to save 
states when the international environment lacked certainty. Collective action at the 
international level was a must to reform the financial system.  
 
The G20 Summit34 on Financial Markets and the World Economy took place on 
November 14–15, 2008.35 The summit gathered, for the first time, the leaders of all 
rich and emerging economies, which represent almost 90% of the global GDP.36 The 
summit followed from the initiatives by France, Britain and the US, upon the 
guidelines set at the G7 meeting of October 11, 2008. The establishment of the guest 
list caused conflict between the US versus Britain and France. France and Britain 
wanted a Bretton Woods II-style gathering to outdo US prestige on the international 
stage. President Bush however, insisted on a G20 gathering, so as to dilute European 
dominance. Bush plan became the winner. The leaders laid down the common 
principles (transparency, integrity, responsibility, and sound banking practice) for 
reforming the financial markets, and launched an action plan; and reaffirmed their 
commitment to free market. It is noteworthy that the summit exhibited the big 
member states’ ambitions on the international arena. However, both the place and the 
guest list of the summit showed that their preferences could not overweigh US 
preferences. 
 
Back home, the issue on the agenda also was the preparation of a common 
action plan. The Commission announced the European Economic Recovery Plan 
(EERP) to come out on November 26.37 In the meantime, the Commission issued a 
proposal on the regulation of credit rating agencies in an effort to increase investor 
                                                 
34 “The Group of Twenty (G-20) Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors was established in 1999 to bring 
together systemically important industrialized and developing economies to discuss key issues in the global 
economy. (…)The G-20 was created as a response both to the financial crises of the late 1990s and to a growing 
recognition that key emerging-market countries were not adequately included in the core of global economic 
discussion and governance.”, “About G20”, the official website, United Kingdom 2009, 
http://www.g20.org/about_what_is_g20.aspx  
35 “2008 G-20 Washington summit”, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bretton_Woods_II, 20.01.2009. 
36  “Not a bad weekend’s work”, The Economist, the official website, 16.11.2008, 
http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12623258, 21.01.2009. 
37 Almunia, Joaquin, European Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Policy, “A recipe for recovery: the 
European response to the financial crisis”, 2nd Brussels' International Economic Forum, Brussels, 11 November 
2008, Press Release, the EU official website, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do? 
reference=SPEECH/08/601&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en, 20.01.2009. 
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protection through enhanced transparency and surveillance; 38  and signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding and a loan agreement with Hungary. The EERP 
came out on November 26. The plan built on the framework as defined by the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). It aimed to restore consumer and business 
confidence, to stimulate investment and innovation, to pursue structural reforms 
especially with regards to the environmental standards, and to alleviate human cost of 
the crisis by reducing job losses, by assisting people in their reintegration into the job 
market. 39  The EERP took actions along three lines; international cooperation, 
coordination at the EU level and between national actions and EU actions, and the use 
of macroeconomic policies to sustain growth. The EERP allowed a temporary fiscal 
stimulus of around €200 billion (1.5% of EU GDP), within both national budgets 
(around €170 billion, 1.2% of GDP), and EU and European Investment Bank (EIB) 
budgets (around €30 billion, 0.3% of GDP) for loans to SMEs to be distributed 
through commercial banks. The plan defined measures to simplify the procedure for 
SMEs and to promote cash flow such as the removal of the requirement to prepare 
annual accounts, or reducing the fees for patent applications. Furthermore, the plan 
simplified the rules on state aid approvals, and called on the member states to reduce 
social charges on employers. Finally, the EU set out short term measures to boost 
demand and investment in infrastructure projects. It is worth reminding that most 
EERP measures aimed to protect the supply side, and they mainly concerned the 
Eurozone economies. 
 
On December 2, the Ecofin council approved the EERP, the directives on bank 
deposit systems, bank capital requirements, and solvency of insurance companies. 
The council invited the member states to swiftly establish national schemes to support 
the banking sector.40 It also called on the Commission to issue the guidelines for 
recapitalisation of the distressed institutions. The Commission fulfilled this task on 
                                                 
38 European Commission, “Commission adopts proposal to regulate credit rating agencies”, Press Release, the 
official website, 12.11.2008, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/1684&format=HTML&aged=0&lan 
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39 European Commission, “A European Economic Recovery Plan”, COM(2008) 800 final, the Eurolex official 
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40 Council of the European Union, “2911th Council meeting”, Press Release, Brussels, 2.12.2008, the official 
website, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ecofin /104530.pdf, 20.01.2009. 
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December 5. 41  In the meantime, the ECB reduced interest rates to 2.5%, which 
constituted the biggest reduction since the introduction of the euro.42 Finally, the EC 
of December 12-13 approved the EERP, the guidelines for recapitalisation, and the 
reduction of interest rates.43 Thus, the EU managed to develop a common action plan 
by the end of the year. In 2009, the EU set about to implement the EERP, as well as 
to promote its actions with regards to liquidity provision, regulation, supervision, and 
financial solidarity.  
 
This section identified that EU actors made initiatives to develop a concerted 
action in this period. The four members, Germany, Italy, France and Britain, kicked 
the process off, and cued the Council meeting of October 14 and the EC of October 
12 by the guidelines that they defined at the emergency meeting on November 4. The 
EU took action along three lines; the banking sector, the real economy and 
international cooperation. The Union first dealt with the issue of state aids, since 
liquidity shortage and the crisis in the banking sector were the immediate threats to 
European economies, particularly those in the Eurozone. The Commission, in its 
communication, regulated the conditions to provide state aids to ailing financial 
institutions and sectors. Accordingly, governments developed rescue packages. One 
problem arising from this practice was the risk that state aids of different nature 
disturbed the proper functioning of the single market. This eventuality compelled the 
Commission to ameliorate the existing legal framework on supervision and 
regulation. Accordingly, the Commission’s supervision and monitoring roles have 
become more important than before. Secondly, by issuing the EERP, the EU kept to 
its first promise, that of defining a collective action plan. Most EERP measures 
however, targeted Eurozone economies rather than non-Eurozone ones. It is worth 
noting that where EU level actions remained insufficient state actors gathered at 
emergency meetings to define individual measures in a concerted way. Thirdly, the 
EU, particularly the four old members, actively partook in the international efforts to 
reform the global financial system. They attempted to outdo US leadership by 
                                                 
41 European Commission, “Communication on Recapitalisation of financial institutions in the current financial 
crisis”, 05.12.2008, the official website, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/ 
legislation/recapitalisation_communication.pdf, 21.01.2009.  
42 European Central Bank, “Monetary policy decisions”, Press Release, the official website, 4 December 2008, 
http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2008/html/pr081204.en.html, 20.01.2009. 
43 Council of the European Union, “conclusions”, Brussels, 11 and 12 December 2008. 17271/08, the official 
website of the Presidency, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/104692.pdf. 
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affecting the guest list and the outcome of the summit. However, the US maintained 
its domination in the international arena. As regards the solidarity commitment, the 
EU granted financial assistance to Hungary. The ECB, which only funds the 
Eurozone members, offered a grant, considering the gravity of the downturn in 
Hungary, and its eventual spread over the Euro non-Euro areas. Thus, in this period, 
the EU seems to have kept to its promises. The next part examines the 
implementation phase of common actions.  
 
II. III. THE IMPLEMENTION PHASE 
 
This section examines the period of implementation of the EU level decisions. 
The objective is to comprehend how EU actors detailed the common guidelines and 
what sort of obstacles emerged in the process. 
 
Following the adoption of the EERP, the Commission immediately set about to 
implement the decisions. It began by addressing unemployment. On December 16, 
the Commission issued a proposal on new skills for new jobs to counter short-term 
unemployment. Therein, the Commission aimed to create jobs by matching skills 
with vacancies, by organising skills assessments on a permanent basis, and by 
improving information sharing between member states. 44  The Commission also 
envisaged spurring employment through the transition to low carbon economy. The 
Commission set to scrutinise on a monthly basis the labour market developments so 
as to respond effectively to the needs. 
 
As regards regulation, the Commission issued a proposal to support specific 
activities in the field of financial services, financial reporting and auditing on January 
23, 2009.45 The proposal enabled direct contributions to the funding of the reporting 
and auditing bodies (such as the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group, 
International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation or Public Interest 
Oversight Board) under the Community budget. With regards to financial solidarity, 
                                                 
44 European Commission, “Communication on New Skills for New Jobs”, Brussels, the Commission official 
website, 16.12.2008, http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=1496&langId=en  
45 European Commission, “Commission Proposal of establishing a Community programme to support specific 
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the EU concluded with Latvia, a Memorandum of Understanding and a Loan 
Agreement that provided up to €3.1 billion, on 26 January.46  
 
Throughout February 2009, EU actors were busy with implementing the EERP, 
monitoring public finances, and restructuring the international financial system. At 
the EU level, the Ecofin Council of February 10 considered, among other things, the 
implementation of the EERP, financial stability and reduced VAT. The ministers 
approbated VAT reduction, on a permanent basis.47 Accordingly, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Finland, France and the 
United Kingdom adopted fiscal stimuli. Furthermore, the Council allowed financial 
support to investments in the energy and infrastructure sectors. Seeing the concerns 
about protectionism and competition, the Commission was invited to review the 
proposal in this matter.  
 
At the international level, the EU attended a G7 meeting on 13-14 February, 
2009. The issue on the floor was the increase of the IMF funding and the problems on 
the real sector. The G7 agreed to reform the IMF and increase its funding, in an effort 
to prevent an eventual spill of the financial turmoil over the emerging markets and 
low-income countries. In addition, the G7 decided to augment liquidity and funding 
through the FSF, regional development banks and the World Bank (WB). 48  As 
regards the real economy, the G7 set to temporarily use individual fiscal stimulus to 
boost domestic demand and job creation. The ministers also welcomed financial 
assistance for vulnerable sectors and firms. They underlined that they would continue 
to monitor exchange markets closely and to take necessary measures against 
protectionism. It is noteworthy that Ecofin decisions overlapped with G7 decisions.  
 
Following the summit, the US adopted the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009. The bill, which President Obama signed into law on 
February 17, was a $787 billion stimulus plan that contained measures such as tax 
                                                 
46  European Commission, “EU provides €3.1 billion Community financial assistance to Latvia”, the official 
website, 03.02.2008, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/thematic_articles/article13872_en.htm  
47 Council of the European Union, “Council Decisions”, Brussels, Press Release, 10 February 2009, 6069/09 
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48 Communique of G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, “Statement of G7 Finance Ministers and 
Central Bank Governors”, Rome, Italy, February 14, 2009,  2009 Italian Presidency Meeting, 
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Meetings/February/Communiques/Documents/Comunicato.pdf&, p.1. 
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cuts, expansion of unemployment benefits and other welfare provisions, and spending 
in education, health care and infrastructure. 49  Some member states had already 
adopted fiscal stimuli in 2008 to cope with the crisis; namely Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Finland and Britain. 
The Commission monitored individual actions, and assessed the stability and 
convergence programmes of member states. It identified that the budgets of the 
countries that took fiscal measures remained within the limits of the SGP; whereas 
Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Latvia and Malta made a budget deficit of more than 
3% in 2008.50 In 2009, member states again, considered providing assistance to some 
ailing sectors as well. The car industry provides an example.  
 
In line with the EU decision of bailing out ailing institutions and sector, car 
producing member states prepared state aids in the automotive industry. Germany 
offered tax incentives for the new cars market; France improved liquidity access.51 
Thereupon, the Commission issued a communication to regulate financial support to 
the car industry; also tightened supervision in this area.52 Nevertheless, the French 
bailout plan to car industry, issued in February 2009, attempted to break the 
competition policy in the Union. In that, France conditioned state aids on not to close 
production sites in France during the duration of the loan.53 The plan raised objection 
by member states, whereupon the French government annulled the territoriality 
clause.  
 
Aid schemes have turned out to be problematic for competition. Because the 
crisis had generated impacts at different levels across member states, the EU could 
not take a uniform measure; it had to leave the design of support schemes to 
governments. However, governments, as the case of French bailout demonstrates, got 
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tempted to break the principles because of domestic problems. The French case sat an 
example to the EU community. The Commission stiffened supervision in other areas 
as well. In response to the recommendations by the ECB, and the concerns raised by 
some delegations at the Council of February 9-10, the Commission issued the 
communication on asset relief measures wherein it laid down the guidelines for 
designing domestic asset relief schemes. Building on the banking communication of 
October 2008 (defining the principles for state aids), and on the recapitalisation 
communication of December 2008 (establishing the principles to recapitalisation of 
banks) the communication left the design of schemes (including asset purchase, 
insurance, swap, and guarantee or hybrid models) to member states. However, 
national schemes would enter into force upon approval by the Commission which 
would check it against protectionism.54  
 
Behind protectionist motives lay domestic problems. In that, social unrest had 
been escalating in Europe since the beginning of 2009, due to the deterioration of the 
economic situation, contraction of purchasing power of households, job losses and 
worsening expectations about future. Strikes and protests were widespread across the 
continent. Workers, trade unions and farmers in France, Hungary, Latvia, Greece, 
Germany, Britain, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Slovakia, the Ukraine and Germany protested 
recession and unemployment. Social costs of the economic downturn urged the heads 
of states to organise an informal meeting on March 1. The leaders agreed to rely on 
the single market to support growth and jobs. They approved the communication on 
the automotive sector, and charged the Commission with assuring effective 
information sharing about national support schemes. As regards unemployment, they 
decided to improve the use of the European Social Fund (ESF) and the revised 
Globalisation Adjustment Fund (GAF) to limit unemployment.55 On the other hand, 
the leaders revisited the solidarity commitment, which the next part will develop.  
 
The Spring EC was the major instance to define the guidelines for dealing with 
the crisis and its social costs. To prepare for the summit, the Commission issued, on 
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March 4, a communication that addressed, mainly, the real economy and financial 
stability. As regards the real economy, the Commission set to simplify criteria for 
support from the ESF, to re-programme spending, and to increase advance payments 
from early 2009, so as to reinforce active labour market policies. It proposed making 
changes to the GAF in a way to intervene quickly to provide cash for training and job 
placement schemes. The communication recommended the extensive use of free 
movement of workers in remedying the mismatches between skills and labour market 
needs, as well as the problem of social dumping. The Commission suggested inciting 
demand for education and training, and developing of ‘green jobs’. With regards to 
the financial sector, the Commission announced the establishment of a new financial 
supervision system and the release of a Communication on retail investment products, 
the implementation of measures to reinforce bank depositor, investor and insurance 
policy holder protection, and measures on responsible lending and borrowing by the 
end of autumn 2009. Moreover, the Commission set to improve risk management in 
financial firms and to align pay incentives with sustainable performance, and review 
the Market Abuse Directive.56 Thus, the communication conveyed the Commission’s 
intention to improve the regulatory and supervisory frames, and to ameliorate the 
situation in job markets while respecting the objectives of the Lisbon strategy, that is, 
promoting competitive knowledge-based economy and safeguarding environmental 
standards. In so doing, the Commission tried to defend community policies against 
eventual defection by member states in the context of crisis. 
 
The Ecofin Council in turn, convened to prepare for the Spring EC. After 
evaluating the economic situation, the Council agreed to take further fiscal measures, 
namely, reducing VAT in ailing sectors.57 Other actions before the Spring Council 
were as follows: The Commission elaborated the impacts of the crisis on pensions, 
and established that the system was relatively robust in the short run.58 The ECB 
decreased interest rates; 59  and the EU signed a Supplemental Memorandum of 
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Understanding of €2 billion with Hungary, on March 11, following the Council 
decision of November 2008.60  
 
At the international level, EU actors participated to the G20 meeting on March 
14, 2009. The theme of the summit was social costs of the crisis. The participants 
stressed to provide assistance to developing economies in turmoil. The countries 
however, divided over whether to bail out before restructuring. The US and Britain 
argued in favour of bailing out before restructuring while Germany and France 
advocated for the contrary. In the end, the G20 decided to augment the IMF’s 
resources through individual contributions, by increasing official borrowing 
arrangements, or by reviewing quotas. As regards growth, the G20 called on the IMF 
to assess and guide states in adopting fiscal measures and interest rate cuts. 61 
Concerning financial stability, the participants agreed to sustain liquidity support, to 
recapitalise banks, to tackle impaired assets, and to improve regulation and 
supervision. Comparing the decisions taken at the international summits such as the 
G20 or G7 to EU level decisions, it can be inferred that financial stability, 
unemployment and supervision constitute common concerns worldwide. In addition, 
both instances chose liquidity provision by central banks to guarantee, recapitalise 
and resolve financial institutions in dealing with the crisis. These actions were of an 
unprecedented nature for policy makers. 62  Also, the summit has exposed the 
divergence of views amongst the big member states, Britain vs. Germany and France 
so to speak. In other words, the EU could not speak with one voice on the 
international arena. 
 
The analysis will finally highlight the main decisions taken at the EC of March 
19-20, 2009, the Spring Council so to speak. The EU took actions along three lines. 
With regards to financial solidarity, the EC decided to double the assistance to non-
Eurozone countries, also agreed to make the €5 billion of the EERP available for 
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infrastructure projects and €75 billion for a voluntary loan to the IMF. 63 Towards the 
financial sector, the EU set to increase regulation and supervision so as to prevent 
protectionism and maintain competition. In addition, the Council urged the member 
states to return to their medium-term budgetary objectives and keep to the SGP. In so 
doing, the EU halted further stimulus measures. As regards unemployment, the 
leaders set to stimulate labour market by promoting the acquisition of the new skills 
for new jobs. They decided to improve the use of social protection systems, and of 
labour mobility.64 So, at this summit, the EU pursued its already existing strategies. 
Only in the field of finances, the Council decided to halt fiscal measures. 
 
In sum, in the implementation phase, EU actors mainly addressed three areas; 
financial stability, the real sector, and international cooperation. In an attempt to 
boost demand and growth, EU actors (both states and the Commission) prioritised 
fiscal measures and state aids to ailing financial institutions and sectors. The 
Commission’s assessment of stability and convergence programmes established that 
the countries that adopted fiscal measures performed better in terms of budgetary 
discipline than others. This finding, the US bailout plan and social costs of the crisis 
at home urged governments to take further fiscal measures and aids schemes. 
However, these measures tended to break the competition rules in the Union, which 
the French bailout plan to the car industry exemplified. Considering defection, the 
Commission, backed by the Council, set to tighten supervision in areas like financial 
operations and support to the real sector. Thus, in a way, what challenged the EU’s 
performance in the implementation phase were protectionist individual actions. 
Finally, EU actors pursued their efforts at the international level. The analysis 
identified a similarity between the EU’s concerns and strategies, and those of the 
international instances like G7 or G20. To what extent does this similarity imply that 
EU level decisions are appropriate for fighting the crisis? Or does the similarity result 
from the commonality that the interests of the industrialised countries dominate these 
instances? The next section elaborates on the appropriateness of the EU’s strategy for 
the Union’s solidarity at the occasions of the informal meeting of the heads of states 
of March 1st, and the Spring EC. 
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II. IV. THE ISSUE OF INEQUALITY 
 
This section aims to evaluate the relevance of the EU’s crisis management 
strategy in relation to the Union’s functioning. In so doing, this part will elaborate the 
ongoing debate in the EU with regards to the ‘more powerful economies (Eurozone 
economies) vs. the weaker ones (non-Eurozone economies)’. 
 
The issue of inequality between member states has been raised at the occasions 
of the informal meeting of the heads of states and the Spring EC. At the backdrop of 
this criticism lay domestic economic problems and the balance of power within the 
EU.  
 
The crisis has hit the non-Eurozone countries later but harder than the Eurozone 
members. The next chapter will develop the impacts of the crisis in detail; but it is 
necessary to give some preliminary information so as to understand the motivations 
behind the criticism on inequality. In the aftermath of the crisis, exports to Western 
Europe dramatically declined due to the shrinking purchasing power of the Western 
households. Moreover, as foreign investors withdrew their money to invest in 
stronger currencies, local currencies depreciated.65 Accordingly, foreign debt became 
more expensive, and budgets made deficits. High budgetary deficit, trade deficit and 
inflation triggered exchange rate volatility. Currency instability led Western European 
banks to reduce foreign currency lending. As a result, the non-Eurozone countries 
suffered from liquidity shortage. Finally, economic slowdown compelled companies 
to lessen productivity and to make layoffs, if not to close down. So, while 
unemployment has been climbing and output has been contracting, social policies 
have become costlier. Governments tended to restrict social spending. 66  Welfare 
deprivation however, engendered social unrest. It is noteworthy that, not all member 
states of the region received damages to the same extent. The countries that were the 
most dependent on foreign investment were the ones that were the worst affected. 
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Hungary, Latvia and Bulgaria feature in this category. Poland and the Czech Republic 
better survived the crisis because their economies depended less on foreign lending. 
In sum, the non-Eurozone members, facing devaluation and liquidity shortage, turned 
to budget cuts, tax rises, and if not sought financial assistance. Therefore, for these 
economies, access to foreign currency liquidity has constituted the main challenge.67 
In contrast, the Eurozone countries (except Ireland) profited from monetary supply by 
the ECB, whereby investing hundreds of billions of euros into public spending, tax 
cuts, bank bailouts and guarantees to industry. This divergence led Eastern European 
members to formulate two demands from the Eurogroup.  
 
The first demand came before the informal meeting of March 1st, and pertained 
to a bailout plan to non-Eurozone countries. In that, financial assistance to Hungary 
and Latvia had motivated Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and the Baltic states to 
formulate a similar demand, on the grounds that their economy had received greater 
damage than the Eurozone ones. It is worth noting that Poland and the Czech 
Republic did not side with the ‘Eastern bloc’. Because they were aspiring to join the 
Eurozone, they denied the need for a region-wide bailout. Hungary requested €25 
billion to prevent that “an ‘Iron Curtain’ be set up and divide Europe into two 
parts”.68 The Commission and the Eurozone members led by Germany declined the 
demand on the grounds that Eastern Europe was already receiving funds and loans 
from the EU, WB and the IMF. After the summit, German Chancellor made its 
reluctance to pay for the poorer members explicit, “saying that the situation is the 
same for all Central and Eastern European states, I don’t see that. You cannot 
compare Slovenia or Slovakia with Hungary.” 69  The non-Eurozone countries 
contested the summit outcomes. They criticised inequality in the Union, and accused 
the Eurozone members of recapitalising domestic companies with bailouts hence 
reducing competitive advantage of Eastern members.70 The occasion also prompted 
the new member states to voice out their dissatisfaction with having been left out of 
the talks with the US, China and Japan. This discord exposed three things; the 
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vulnerability the EU’s solidarity commitment, the divergence of views over the ways 
of handling the crisis within the EU, and the non-existence of an ‘Eastern bloc’.  
 
The second demand came up prior to the EC spring in March 2009. Poland 
asked facilitated early entry to the Eurozone under the same conditions as the current 
members, which were allowed to depart from the SGP rules.71 The demand aimed to 
resolve the exchange rate volatility problem and to benefit from Eurozone 
membership. To remind, exchange rate volatility caused trade deficits, budgetary 
deficits and devaluation. In the aftermath of the crisis, the Polish zloty had fell by 
15% against the euro; the Hungarian Forint declined about 13.7% against the euro; 
the Czech Koruna has slumped by 9.2% and the Romanian Leu by 6.7%.72 Currency 
instability triggered serious macroeconomic and social problems. As for Eurozone 
membership, Eurozone countries enjoyed the ECB’s liquidity provisions (in the form 
of lending and temporary currency swaps) of which non members were deprived. In 
short, the facilitated early entry the Eurozone would help end currency fluctuations, 
thereby instil predictability, enable higher stability in planning, and facilitate 
transactions. The Eurozone countries and the Commission objected to the proposal.73  
 
On the other hand, in March 2009, EU actors revised their stance over bailouts 
to non-Euro area. In that, recession and exchange rate volatility in the region 
threatened the Eurozone because of the instability risk and heavy investments of some 
Western European banks in the region. The Austrian banks had the largest market 
shares; the other investors were Italy, France, Belgium, Germany and Sweden. These 
banks operated mostly in the Balkan countries, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic, 
Romania, Croatia and Bulgaria.74  Interlinks in the banking system had urged the 
Austrian government to lobby for a €150 million bailout for Eastern European banks 
prior to the summit. Western European members led by Germany turned the Austrian 
proposal down. Germany in particular, was reluctant to compensate for the “mistakes 
                                                 
71  “Eastern EU members seek shelter from economic storm”, EurActiv, 20.02.2009, 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/euro/eastern-eu-members-seek-shelter-economic-storm/article-179614. 
72 Schneeweiss, et.al. ibid.  
73  “Eurogroup chief rules out quick easing of euro candidate rules”, EU Business, 01.03.2009, 
http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/1235906228.19/  
74 “Hungary: The Hungarian Financial Crisis’ Impact on Austrian Banks”, Stratfor, 20.10.2008.   
 31 
of Austria’s banks”.75 On the other hand, prior to the summit, some actors shifted 
position. France began worrying about the spread of instability over the Euro area. 
Therefore, France gave support to the Hungarian proposal, and lobbied Germany; but 
the latter did not mirror the enthusiasm.76 Further to that, the Commission asked 
Germany to lift its opposition to the €5 billion package for Eastern Europe. Finally, 
Luxembourg’s PM, also the head of the Eurogroup, argued in favour of financial 
support due to his concern about escalating mass unemployment and the resulting 
social problems. On the other hand, Poland and the Czech Republic formed a 
coalition with Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia 
to dilute the predomination of Western interests at the EC.77 Hence, the group in 
favour of bailouts gained in size on Germany on the eve of the summit.  
 
The Spring EC approved the Hungarian proposal. Emphasising solidarity 
between member states, EU leaders decided to double to the €50 billion financial 
assistance to non-Eurozone countries facing balance of payments problems. The EU 
had so far been assisting balance of payment problems through the structural and 
cohesion funds, the application of reduced VAT, and the EIB actions to boost SME 
financing possibilities. With the new decision, the EU has overall made up to €30 
billion available from resources. However, the clause contained a condition, that is, 
bailouts would be decided on a case-by-case basis. Thus, the Eurozone refused to 
acquiesce to a region-wide assistance scheme, the original plan so to speak. In a way, 
Western Europe again had its interests be accepted by introducing the ‘case-by-case 
basis’ clause. So, the decision on doubling the ceiling for assistance could but partly 
satisfy the Eastern bloc. It is noteworthy that the shift in German position enabled the 
compromise. Two reasons underlay the German reversal. Firstly, Germany was “a 
nation reliant on exports”; therefore it needed to contribute to resuscitating the global 
economy so as to continue exporting.78 In effect, one major cause behind Germany’s 
approval to financial assistance is that Central and Eastern Europe imports heavily 
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from Germany.79 Secondly, Germany would not agree to bail out for the sake of 
bankers; it would do so only “to protect the jobs and savings of citizens and to avoid 
businesses coming to a standstill”. 80 In other words, the already existing credit flows 
on which Germany had agreed accounted for a precaution against an immediate 
meltdown of the financial system; and they aimed to restore stability of the financial 
infrastructure. 81  In effect, the German Chancellor, together with the Dutch PM, 
believed “market driven and social world economy (…) generates (…) confidence 
and stability”.82 In this vein, the deepening recession in the non-Eurozone economies 
posed a threat to German priorities. It risked spreading instability over the Eurozone, 
and aggravating the slowdown of economic activities. In short, macroeconomic 
concerns led Germany and other members opposing bailouts to reverse their position.  
 
To sum, the EU’s crisis management strategy raised the criticism of inequality 
in the Union in 2009. The non-Eurozone members voiced their dissatisfaction at the 
occasions of the informal meeting of the heads of states on March 1st, 2009 and of the 
Spring Council. What prompted this criticism was the rejection of the two demands 
that the non-Eurozone countries had formulated in February and March 2009, by the 
Eurozone members and the Commission. The first proposition concerned bailout to 
non-Eurozone; and the second one pertained to early facilitated entry to Eurozone. At 
the backdrop of the complaints lay domestic economic problems in Eastern Europe, 
and the dissatisfaction with the EU’s crisis management strategy and the 
predomination of the interests of Eurozone countries. To remind a finding of the 
previous sections, the EU’s strategy mainly consisted of liquidity provision, of fiscal 
measures and state aids to ailing institutions and sectors, to boost demand and to 
maintain the unemployment level. This strategy was appropriate to tackle the impacts 
of the crisis in industrialised economies, which the similarity between the decisions 
taken at the EU and those taken at G7 and G20 shows. However, the measures were 
only partly relevant for the non-Eurozone economies which were deprived of 
liquidity provision by the ECB, and suffered from exchange rate volatility. As a 
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result, the new member states felt themselves as ‘second rank’ members despite all 
institutional and legal arrangements to assure equality and democracy in the Union. 
The divergence also has exposed the vulnerability of EU solidarity. The augmentation 
of financial assistance to non-Eurozone only party rectified the image, because aids 
were conditioned to approval on a case-by-case basis. This clause conveyed that the 
Eurozone countries had their interests accepted at the EU level. Moreover, the 
decision to increase the ceiling for aids schemes resulted from the macroeconomic 
concerns of the old member states, namely those of Germany and France, and not 
veritably from non-Eurozone lobbying. On the whole, the discord has proved that 
state interests prevail in the EU. Of the member states, the interests of the Eurozone 
members, and those of France, Germany, Britain and Italy in particular, dominate EU 
level decisions. The Eurozone members are not keen on financial solidarity when 
their interests are at stake. Also, a solid ‘Eastern bloc’ does not exist, which the lack 
of Polish and Czech support to the Hungarian proposal demonstrates. However, it 
tends to come about when these countries want to counterpoise ‘Western domination’ 
as the latter name it. Finally, the EU’s strategy may be relevant for an industrialised 
country but it is handicapped for a Union that is composed of both the industrialised 
and developing countries. 
 
To recap, this chapter has examined the impacts of the crisis on European 
economies and EU actors’ actions and responses to face them. The analysis covered 
the period from September 2008, when the crisis broke out, to the end of March 2009 
when the Spring EC took place.  
 
The first section tracked the outbreak of the crisis and the immediate responses 
of the member states. The analysis identified that the crisis touched the Eurozone 
economies first, because their banking sectors were more integrated into the 
international financial system than the others. The states initially took unilateral 
actions to contain the damages; but economic interdependence urged them to take 
multilateral actions and enhance cooperation. The initiative to develop a common 
action plan emerged in October 2008. In this period, EU actors also made the 
commitment of solidarity between member states. The initiatives began by the 
emergency meeting between Britain, France, Germany and Italy. The leaders 
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discussed the strategy to take in fighting the crisis. The decisions reflected on the 
following EC and Council meetings where the EU defined the guidelines for a 
common EU strategy. In other words, the EU’s orientations have stemmed from the 
four influential members rather than the EU-27. Following the summits, the EU first, 
allowed state aids to distress the banking sector. Then, the Commission implemented 
the defined guidelines in the EERP. In the mean time, the EU actively partook in the 
international efforts to restructure the global financial system.  
 
In the implementation period, the EU took actions along three lines, financial 
stability, the real sector and international cooperation. In so doing, it faced the 
problem of regulation due to the disparate natures of the rescue packages. The French 
bailout plan to the car industry has demonstrated that when nation interests are at 
stake, member states tend to breach the competition rules. On the other hand, the 
analysis established that the EU’s crisis management strategy mostly targeted the 
Eurozone economies. However, EU actions overlapped with G7 and G20 actions.  
 
The final section elaborated the appropriateness of EU strategy for the Union 
through the cases of two demands by the non-Eurozone countries. The non-Eurozone 
group asked bailout and early facilitated accession to Eurozone. The partial relevance 
of EU level actions to their domestic problems and the dissatisfaction with being left 
out of decision making process motivated the demands. The Commission and the 
Eurozone members turned the requests down. The rejections prompted the argument 
of inequality within the Union. The analysis identified that the old Eurozone members 
revised their position at the Spring EC for macroeconomic concerns. The decision of 
doubling aid scheme could only partly satisfy the non-Eurozone countries, because 
assistance was conditioned to an evaluation on a case-by-case basis. This finding 
conveys that the Eurozone interests again overweighed the non-Eurozone concerns.  
 
On the whole, the chain of events has demonstrated that the interests of Britain, 
France, Germany and Italy in particular, are predominant in the Union. This pattern 
which had been present prior to the Eastern enlargements has not altered with 
institutional reforms. In other words, the accession of large Eastern European 
countries did not change the balance of power within the Union. Also, the crisis has 
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shown the inappropriateness of the EU’s crisis management strategy for a Union 
composed of both industrialised and developing countries. Moreover, the crisis has 
exposed the vulnerability of EU solidarity. The issue of inequality, because it 
challenges solidarity in the Union, requires rethinking the future of the integration 
with 27 members. Finally, the analysis infers that social implications of the crisis are 
likely to be bothering the EU in the medium and long term, unemployment in 
particular. Social problems are of a critical nature for the new member states, because 
they risk challenging support to the EU, the legitimacy of national governments, but 
more importantly public trust in the efficiency of the EU’s liberal economy. The 
performance of welfare state in alleviating social costs is crucial in this regard. The 
next chapter will analyse the social costs of the crisis and the measures to counter 
them in the context of the EEC.  
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CHAPTER III  
THE MACROECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE CRISIS ON 
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE  
 
This chapter develops social and economic impacts of the crisis in Central and 
Eastern Europe. The chapter is structured in two sections. The first one analyses the 
macroeconomic performances of the new member states from the pre-accession 
period to the outbreak of the crisis. The second part dwells upon the impacts of the 
macroeconomic impacts of the crisis in the region. The objective in this chapter is to 
comprehend whether the crisis has caused damages at different levels across the 
region, thereby to test the validity of the German argument. The analysis covers the 
period from pre-accession to the aftermath of the crisis. Data is collected from official 
reports and working papers by the EU, the IMF and the WB, as well as from articles, 
and analyses in the media.  
III. I. Accession and Adjustment to the EU Policies 
 
This section elaborates on the macroeconomic impacts of EU accession in 
Central and Eastern European countries. The objective is to understand the extent to 
which the pre-accession process and experiences with membership have engendered 
similar conditions. So doing will help comprehend whether these countries were at 
the same level when they faced the crisis. 
 
It has become widespread to use the denomination of the ‘EEC’ or ‘CEEC’ to 
designate the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This abbreviation gives a 
delusive impression that these countries are alike. However, not only these countries 
display different ethnic, economic and political characteristics, but also, they are 
dissimilar in terms of their economic and political performances in the EU. Their 
varied performance during the pre-accession process had led the Commission to 
regroup them as the first and second wave candidates. This thesis will designate them 
as the new member states (NMS), by, of course, leaving Cyprus and Malta out; also, 
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occasionally, C5 will stand for Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Slovenia. 
 
Notwithstanding disparities, the NMS followed some trends. To put it bluntly, 
the EU accession process has spurred growth and development in the region. First of 
all, the opening to international markets has channelled a greater amount of goods and 
services, and foreign capital into these economies. Trade opening has increased 
knowhow, and has enabled local firms to get support from Western companies. 
Secondly, integration to EU market has spurred trade, foreign direct investments 
(FDI), and growth and decline in poverty thereof.83 Absolute poverty has declined in 
almost all NMS.84 In the last five years, “the region’s annual real GDP growth has 
averaged close to 6%, accelerating the recovery that had started in the late 1990s”.85 It 
is noteworthy that growth stemmed from technological progress, “rapid credit growth 
and a consumption boom financed by foreign currency borrowing” in the region.86 
Labour made a modest, if not a negative contribution to growth. 87  In effect, 
immigration outweighed emigration in most NMS; the shortage of skilled labour has 
emerged therefrom. Immigration rate was particularly high for Latvia, Lithuania, 
Bulgaria, Romania and Poland.88 The countries that recorded higher growth rates 
were the ones that had greater capital accumulation and technological progress.89  
 
 
Thirdly, financial integration to the EU has channelled a considerable amount of 
credit towards NMS economies thanks to favourable political conditions and low 
interest rates. Credit flows came in the form of FDI, bank loans and portfolio 
investment. They caused two sorts of problems. First of all, these “flows have 
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financed activities in the non tradable sectors and have contributed to overheating of 
the economies: the larger the capital inflows, the stronger the demand boom, the 
greater the overheating of the domestic economy and the larger the widening of the 
current account deficit”.90 Secondly, as seen in Table I, Western European banks, 
especially from Austria, Sweden and Italy, made huge investments in the NMS 
banking sector.91 These banks undertook operations in the form of foreign currency 
lending (which consisted of offering mortgages, personal loans and business loans in 
euros and Swiss francs).92 This practice was particularly widespread in the Balkan 
countries, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Romania, Croatia and Bulgaria.93 
However, such operations bore the risk of bloating external debts, causing budgetary 
imbalances because of currency mismatches.  Currency mismatches rendered private 
sector vulnerable to exchange rate depreciation. 94  So, credit inflow has amply 
contributed to growth, but also to external debts and risk taking in some NMS.95  
Table 3.1.1 
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Fourthly, EU accession has improved price stability in the NMS.96 To meet the 
EU accession criteria, the NMS followed anti-inflationary policies. However, the 
intense credit flow by putting pressure on prices challenged these attempts. The other 
factors causing inflation were productivity growth (which increased wages, prices of 
goods and services), and the exchange rate regime (the countries that opted hard 
peg,97 such as Bulgaria, the Baltic States, Poland and the Czech Republic, recorded a 
higher level inflation than others).98 On the other hand, the choice of exchange rate 
regime played an important role in meeting the criteria for entering the Eurozone. 
Cihák and Fonteyne’s study conveyed that “inflation targeting countries were more 
likely to meet the criterion while those with hard pegs were less likely to do so; and 
also, countries with higher GDP per capita and higher degrees of central bank 
independence were more likely to satisfy the criterion”. 99  A final factor that 
facilitated the entry to the Eurozone was political commitment to deliver the 
necessary reforms. 
 
The favourable trends however, have begun undergoing a downward pressure 
by 2008. The IMF report of Regional Economic Outlook of April 2008 stated that 
growth rates were decelerating due to trade and financial openness. 100  The IMF 
identified a greater risk for the countries that depended on foreign capital and that 
were facing balance of payment problems. The IMF’s forecast has turned out to be 
accurate in the aftermath of the crisis; Hungary, Latvia, Bulgaria and Lithuania, 
whose economies were the most dependent on foreign investments, were the ones to 
be the worst damaged by the crisis. Three other factors challenged growth in the 
period preceding the crisis; the rising inflation resulting from the developments in 
commodity markets, unemployment and regional disparities. 101  Despite 
vulnerabilities, the IMF saw growth potential in some countries of the region.  
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Fifthly, the EU contributed to growth and development in the region by 
pressuring reforms and providing financial assistance. In the pre-accession period, the 
Commission compelled governments to fulfil the scheduled reform list through the 
conditionality, timing and benchmarking. The accession perspective has urged 
governments to undertake the reforms quicker than otherwise. After accession, the 
eventuality of changeover to euro has urged governments to follow sounder fiscal and 
budgetary policies. Also, the Lisbon Agenda has forced governments to adopt 
structural reforms. Even if no NMS government could attain the Lisbon objectives, 
they ameliorated their performance with regards to employment and social policies. 
Concerning financial assistance, the EU has been helping the NMS to close the 
income gap by funding public infrastructure projects, employment policies and 
private firms (for restructuring) within the framework of the cohesion policy. The 
Union also has been offering direct income support to households through the 
Common Agricultural Policy.102  These initiatives have significantly improved the 
living conditions in the NMS; but have not sufficed to shift them to the level of their 
Western neighbours.  
Table 3.1.2 
 
Despite commonalities, the NMS displayed significant disparities. Table 3.1.2 
shows that between 2000 and 2008, Baltic economies showed the best performances 
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amongst the NMS.103 According to the IMF statistics, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia 
had the highest growth rates in Europe from 2000 to 2006. The growth rates peaked 
in 2006; the percentages were 11.2% for Estonia, 11.9% for Latvia and 7.5% for 
Lithuania. 104  In all three countries, growth was driven by domestic demand, 
investments (propelled by income growth), rapid credit expansion and stimulus from 
EU funds.105 Private consumption was sustained by wage increases. Growth rates 
began decelerating in 2007 as a result of faltering private consumption and anti-
inflationary policies aimed to end the price boom in mortgages and in the real estate 
market.106 In Estonia, growth faltered also because of a decline in net exports.107 In 
the Baltic states, domestic demand sustained as a result of the credit and housing 
booms. Strong private consumptions triggered high inflation in these countries.108 
With regards to the labour market, employment rates improved significantly; 
unemployment dropped, in 2009, to 5.6 in Latvia109, to 4.9 in Estonia110 and to 4.4 in 
Lithuania.111 Growing employment tightened labour market; these countries suffered 
from skilled labour shortage. To remind, these countries had had significant levels of 
emigration after the accession, which created labour shortage, and put pressure on 
wages. These developments prompted external and internal imbalances with 
significant threats to financial stability.112 But hopefully, the Baltic states had greater 
fiscal stability, higher transparency, and a sounder banking system owing to better 
supervision and affiliations to foreign banks. They nevertheless were vulnerable 
because of rapid credit expansion. In that, most credit flow came in foreign exchange 
and banks were taking on increasing exposures to real estate, which brought 
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substantial risks to the banks’ asset quality, their performance of reserve coverage 
from short-term debt113, and financial stability.114  Foreign credits also augmented 
external debt. As regards public finances, Estonia and Latvia had budgetary surpluses 
resulting from high growth, employment rates and revenues. Estonia displayed the 
lowest level of public debt in 2007 across the EU.115 Only in Lithuania, budget made 
deficit after the accession; and that because of insufficient tax revenues. The deficit 
widened in 2008 due to tax and pensions reforms.116 The Baltic performance was 
superior to others thanks to some additional benefits; the relatively slower population 
growth, and their proximity of Nordic markets and Russia (while C5 markets were 
oriented to Germany and its neighbours). 117  Finally, the Baltic States retrenched 
public sector, and managed to attract foreign direct investment owing to their greater 
integration in international trade and more flexible labour markets.  
 
The Baltic performances were outstanding; and yet Slovenia and Slovakia 
managed to join the Eurozone. Slovenian and Slovakian successes owed to low 
deficits and debt levels, as well as political determination to adopt euro. The 
government’s commitment to changeover to euro was backed up by a favourable 
political opinion in Slovenia. In 2006, “Slovenia had the highest ratio of respondents 
who were emotionally ready for the replacement of their national currency (72%, +8), 
followed by Slovakia (55%, +1)”.118 In Slovakia however, public, although high, was 
not one of the most acquiescent to the adoption of euro amongst the NMS; in 2008, 
the percentage of the citizens who were happy about the changeover was 52% (vs. 
43% unhappy) while the scores were 62% (vs. 21%) in Romania and 59% (vs. 31%) 
in Latvia.119   
 
Slovenia distinguished from other NMS by its relatively greater prosperity. This 
comparative advantage has created a favourable environment for reforms in the 
country. Governments carried the reforms out in consensus by the political elite and 
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people. In contrast, public in the poorer NMS appeared less eager to undertake EU 
reforms with unpopular policy consequences.120 Slovenia significantly improved its 
economic performance in the period from 2004 to 2008, after the accession so to 
speak, owing to sound fiscal policies. Rapid growth was driven by gross capital 
formation and household consumption. Output by the manufacturing sector also 
contributed to growth performance. On the other hand, Slovenia had a negative score 
on net exports due to high import growth after accession.121 Fiscal discipline enabled 
low deficits and debts levels, as well as low inflation.122 The country displayed the 
lowest debt level amongst the NMS in 2005.123 Thanks to this performance, Slovenia 
became the first new member to access the Eurozone in January 2007. On the other 
hand, the banking sector remains underdeveloped. According to IMF Report on 
Slovenia, the sector comprises a few large state-owned banks with low profitability. 
Besides, the banks largely rely on foreign investments and loans from Western 
European banks. In an attempt to increase profits, banks have been augmenting 
operations in the region, thereby rising their vulnerability to interest rates and funding 
risks.124  
 
Slovak economy made a leap forward after accession. In 2006, “real GDP grew 
by 8.5%, and inflation accelerated to 4.5%”. 125  The growth has pursued its 
acceleration till the advent of the crisis. The growth was propelled mainly by 
domestic demand, gross fixed capital formation in the construction and infrastructure 
sectors, and partly by exports. High level of wages and employment growth sustained 
private demand. In 2007, the country featured a trade surplus.126 Fiscal deficit in 2006 
rose to 3.4% of GDP due to pension reform that the government delivered in 
preparing for elections.127 Sustained growth in Slovakia increased tax revenue in 2007 
and 2008 whereby the government managed to narrow down budgetary deficit. 
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Accordingly, Slovakia fulfilled the SGP criteria, and joined the Eurozone on January 
1st, 2009.  
 
The Czech Republic displayed one of the highest income levels in the Union, 
net exports, low levels of inflation, fiscal consolidation, strong balance of payments, 
and foreign direct investments amounting to approximately to 50% of GDP.128 “The 
real GDP growth rose from 1.9% in 2002 to over 6% in the years 2005-7”.129 
Consumer demand, investments, FDI and exports have propelled growth. In addition, 
wages and social benefits have improved, whereby sustaining private consumption. 
Unemployment has tended to slump, while inflation was kept under control. 130 
Growth occurred mainly in manufacturing sector, but also in electronics and the car 
industry. Czech economy attracted FDI in its industries and particularly in the sectors 
where foreign-affiliated companies are dominant. In 2008, growth levels slightly fell 
while budgetary deficit tended to rise due to fiscal measures undertaken in view of 
meeting the SGP criteria. To this end, the country reduced social spending.  
 
Poland’s economic performance improved from the pre-accession period to 
2008, as shown in the table. In 2007, real GDP growth attained 7.1%.131 Private 
consumption and investments triggered growth, respectively by 6% and 25.3%.132 
FDI and credit flows also have contributed to growth. Wage increases and 
improvements in the labour market sustained consumption, thereby growth. The 
country witnessed the rise of both exports and imports in this term. On the other hand, 
by 2008, growth tended to decelerate due to shrinking exports (resulting from 
faltering external demand) and rising investment.  
 
Hungary is the only country whose growth rate worsened from the period from 
the pre-accession to the accession period. In 2007, growth made a significant drop 
(scoring 0.1% in the second quarter of 2007) as a result of government’s 
consolidation efforts. The main motors of growth were private consumption, exports, 
EU funds and foreign investments. In Hungary, private consumption contracted in 
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contrast to the augmentation of exports to Western Europe and foreign investments.133 
It is noteworthy that foreign investments have buttressed the country’s vulnerability 
due to the risk of capital outflow. This risk has come true after the crisis. In addition, 
foreign capital contributed to current account and fiscal deficits. Budgetary deficit 
peaked in 2006 (9.2%).134 Accordingly, the government introduced fiscal measures, 
and retrenched public sector.  Fiscal discipline policies however, have decreased 
growth.135  
 
Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in 2007. EU accession perspective 
underlies the amelioration of economic performance from the period 2000, 2004 to 
the period between 2004, 2008. Both countries are middle income countries with 
gross national income per capita being, US$ 6150 in 2007 for Romania, and US$ 
5490 in 2008 for Bulgaria.136 These scores lag behind the EU average. Romanian 
growth rose to 7.7% in 2006. The propellers of growth in Romania were private 
consumption, gross fixed capital formation and exports. Consumption was sustained 
by wage raises and high domestic credit availability.137 On the other hand, domestic 
demand, by fuelling imports, put pressure on the trade deficit. In the pre-accession 
period, Romania attracted a significant amount of FDI owing to privatisations. After 
2007 however, privatisations decelerated, thereby foreign capital inflow in the 
country has slowed down. Romania displayed budget deficit around 2.7% in 2007, 
and was expected to further rise before the outbreak of the crisis. The reason 
propelling budget deficit was the increase in government consumption which 
stemmed from pay rise in the public sector and social transfers. The expansion of 
budget deficit mirrored as the deterioration of debt-GDP ratio.138 On the other hand, 
growth increased from 2003 to 2006. Like in Romania, growth in Bulgaria was 
spurred by FDI, credit growth, investments and domestic demand. Similar to 
Romania, wage increases and employment sustained private consumption. After 
                                                 
133 op.cit., p.96. 
134 ibid 
135  World Bank, Hungary, Country Brief, the official website, October 2008, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/HUNGARYEXTN/0,,menuPK:302090
~pagePK:141132~piPK:141107~theSitePK:302081,00.html  
136  World Bank, Bulgaria, Country Brief, the official website, April 2009, 
http://www.worldbank.bg/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/BULGARIAEXTN/0,,menuPK:30544
8~pagePK:141132~piPK:141107~theSitePK:305439,00.html; World Bank, Romania, Country Brief, the official 
website, April 2009, http://www.worldbank.org.ro/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/ROMANI 
AEXTN/0,,contentMDK:20636934~menuPK:287302~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:275154,00.html  
137 “European Economy, Economic Forecast Autumn 2007”, op.cit., p.110. 
138 op.cit., pp.110-111. 
 46 
2003, growing FDI flows also contributed to growth. FDI inflow, together with the 
re-acceleration of credit growth propelled investment demand.139 FDI targeted mainly 
the manufacturing, finance, construction and real estate sectors.140 Expansion in these 
sectors partly improved the employment level. Unemployment persisted; and has 
generated wage pressures. Besides, rising inflation tightened the labour market, and 
has caused high skilled labour shortage.141 It is worth reminding that the country’s 
trade deficit shifted from 14.9% in 2004 to 23.8% in 2008. On the other hand, 
budgetary balance improved from 2004 (2.3) to 2008 (3.1). Having established the 
main characteristics of NMS economies, Table 3.1.3 resumes what has propelled 
growth in each country. So doing will facilitate to understand, in the next part, how 
the crisis has added to the vulnerabilities in each economy. 
Table 3.1.3 
Country
private consumption investments credit flow/FDI exports EU funds Gross fixed capital
Baltic States X X X X
Slovenia X X
Slovakia X X
Czech Republic X X X X
Poland X X X
Hungary X X X X
Bulgaria X X X
Romania X X X X
The propellers of Growth
 
This section examined the NMS performances after the accession. The analysis 
established that all NMS underwent the same external impacts. EU integration 
benefited to all NMS in terms of growth, fiscal and budgetary positions, and the 
development of social policy standards. On the other hand, the NMS amply varied 
from one another. The disparity begot from the difference in their initial economic 
situation, as well as from the difference between political and social characteristics. 
Slovenia for instance, had relatively greater prosperity; and the latter has eased the 
adoption of reforms. In addition, Slovakian and Slovenian governments were more 
committed to join the Eurozone than others. As a result, despite the outstanding 
performances by the Baltic states, Slovakia and Slovenia managed to join the 
Eurozone earlier than others after having rectified their budgetary positions. On the 
other hand, this section identified vulnerabilities in the countries with greater amount 
of debts in foreign currency. In addition, the NMS experiencing housing booms 
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suffered from speculations. Finally, the NMS whose growth was triggered by exports 
to Western Europe appeared to be sensitive to the fluctuations in the purchasing 
power of households in the Western region. So, having established the particular 
vulnerabilities in the NMS, the next section proceeds to the analysis of the impacts of 
the crisis. 
 
III. II. The Impacts of the Crisis on Central and Eastern Europe 
 
This section elaborates on the macroeconomic implications of the crisis. The 
objective is to see how the common adversities engendered by the financial crisis 
have added to the domestic vulnerabilities.  
 
To remind some findings of the previous chapter, the crisis emerged in the 
financial sector. The deterioration of the financial situation has worsened 
expectations, hence causing liquidity shortage and uncertainty. “Tighter financial 
conditions, falling wealth, and greater uncertainty have triggered a sharp decline 
across all types of demand”.142 Following plunging global demand, commodity prices 
and trade have contracted. Accordingly, inflation fell, investments and exports 
therefrom. Due to the interconnection with the financial system, the real economy 
also has been upset; firms began closing down; layoffs have escalated. In short, the 
world economy has fallen into recession. Industrialised economies received the 
impacts of the crisis earlier than emerging economies because of their greater 
exposure to the international finance and trade systems. 143  The EU follows the 
pattern.  
 
Across the Union, output and trade have fallen, thereby prosperity. Due to the 
diminution of global demand, European economies are unlikely to rely on trade for 
recovery in the medium term. In the finance sector, the lack of confidence has 
hindered risk taking. As a result, the cost of capital is expected to remain high in the 
immediate future, which raises concerns about liquidity shortage. Accordingly, the 
risk of capital outflow has increased for the economies depending on foreign capital. 
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In addition, even if all economies faced disinflation, the challenge seems to be greater 
for the countries with fixed exchange regimes.144 The countries with high external 
debts have received heavy damages. Also, the crisis has deflated housing booms; and 
has worsened account deficits. Having established the EU-wide patterns of the crisis, 
let us now focus on the NMS specific implications. 
 
The crisis has grasped the NMS via Western Europe. It has arrested credit-
fuelled growth in Central and Eastern Europe.145 “Downturn was triggered by the 
global financial crisis and the sharp drop in trade”.146  So, all NMS have undergone 
decline in output and in stock prices, increases in sovereign bond spreads, and 
devaluation.147 One reason behind these phenomena was the rise of “credit-default 
swaps on sovereign debts”, which in turn, has triggered the risk of default in the 
region.148 In response to this risk, Western banks having investments in the region 
curtailed foreign currency lending. This restriction, by causing liquidity shortage, has 
unsettled the domestic interbank money markets, thereby generating depreciation. 
Some local banks have collapsed in the process, while others have become dependent 
on Western banks for financing. On the other hand, as the banks became stricter in 
granting loans, customers began paying late. Accordingly, economic activity 
decelerated; thereby unemployment has begun escalating. 149  Another source of 
vulnerability was high current account deficit. Account deficit has worsened the 
countries’ riskiness for lending to them, as well as the cost of borrowing for them. As 
was established in the previous section, NMS economies displayed wider current 
account deficits, external debts, higher inflation and greater dependence on credit 
flow. Given these vulnerabilities, the NMS received greater damages by the crisis 
than the Eurozone economies.150 On the other hand, damages occurred at different 
levels. In sum, interlinks with Western Europe that once had contributed to growth 
have proved a source of vulnerability for the NMS, by aggrandising risk exposure in 
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the region. Having established the common characteristics, let us now see how these 
implications have diffused into the NMS. 
 
The IMF thesis is that the extent to which the NMS have withstood the 
downturn depended on whether they had sound macroeconomic policies before the 
crisis.151 Macroeconomic stability designates low inflation, little fiscal deficit and low 
external debts. Secondly, the extent to which governments could cope with 
inflationary pressures and account deficits (stemming from capital inflows) before the 
crisis is another structural determinant of good crisis management. Thirdly, the use of 
the flexible exchange rate helps better control inflation. Finally, the countries, 
especially those of a smaller size, where growth resulted from exports to Western 
Europe are affected by the shrinking purchasing power of Western European 
households. Table 3.2.1 displays the impacts of the crisis across the NMS.152 This 
section proceeds with an analysis of member states’ economies so as to pinpoint the 
country-specific disparities.   
Table 3.2.1 
 
 
Of the NMS, Slovenia and Slovakia have been cushioned by the crisis owing to 
their better regulated and sounder banking sectors, as well as Eurozone membership. 
In Slovakia, the crisis has produced little impact on the banking system; no rescue 
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operations have taken place. The crisis has yet deteriorated exports, domestic 
demand, output, budgetary deficit and inflation. Due to shrinking purchasing power 
of Western households, exports fell by 30% in January, and output in the 
manufacturing industry by 32.7%. Especially, the car industry has been damaged.153 
In addition, private consumption has faltered due to diminishing inflation and pension 
indexation. Likewise, investments have plunged as a result of slowing economic 
activity, tighter credit conditions and deteriorating investor sentiment. Accordingly, 
“growth is expected to contract by around 2.5% in 2009 and to slightly rebound by ¾ 
in 2010.154 Furthermore, the crisis has augmented government deficits. Even so, the 
Commission predicts for Slovakia the highest growth within the EU. Also, Slovakia 
displays the best credit rating. 155  On the other hand, in Slovenia, the crisis has 
manifested its worst impacts on domestic demand, exports, investments and 
unemployment, hence on growth. High inflation, escalating unemployment and 
weakened consumer confidence have resulted in a decline in private consumption 
despite government efforts to circumvent it by raising wages and employment. The 
rising labour cost has hit the real sector, especially on construction and manufacturing 
sectors. Exports have declined due to shrinking purchasing power of Western 
households. Import level sustained; but due to falling exports, trade balance made 
deficit. In sum, output dropped by 4.1% in the final quarter of 2008. The commission 
forecasts growth to contract by 3.4% in 2009, and to rise to 0.7% in 2010.156 In line 
with slumping growth, budgetary deficit is expected to expand to 5.5% of GDP in 
2009.157 To sum, the two Eurozone members have circumvented the worst impacts of 
the crisis thanks to Eurozone cushioning but also due to domestic advantages, 
meaning better regulated sounder banking sector, low debt and deficit levels, an 
export-oriented economy and dynamic domestic consumption. Thus, the two 
countries fared well, despite economic slowdown; but the latter is a worldwide trait.  
 
The crisis has caused recession in the Czech Republic. Its main impacts have 
revealed as the deterioration of labour market conditions, consumer expectations and 
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tight credit conditions. Due to declining external demand, exports have made a 
negative contribution to output for the first time since the accession.158 In addition, 
despite falling inflation, domestic demand has weakened due to rising unemployment 
and poor credit flow. Accordingly, growth has been deprived of its two main 
propellers; namely exports and domestic consumption. Growth has diminished to 
3.2% in the 2008 and is expected to contract by 2.7% in 2009. 159  Industrial 
production has slumped, and particularly on manufacturing; layoffs have augmented 
thereof. Wages in the private sector have shrunk, while they somehow have sustained 
in the public sector. Such being the main indicators, the Commission estimates 
budgetary deficit to widen to 4.3% in 2009 and further to 4.9% in 2010; while it 
expects debts to rise to 38% of GDP in 2010.160 However, as Table 3.2.1 shows, 
external debts are the lowest in the non-Euro area. Like Slovenia and Slovakia, the 
Czech Republic has hedged the adversities of the crisis thanks to its sounder banking 
sector. Czech banks have survived the financial turmoil, as the country was less 
dependent on foreign capital than some of its neighbours. This characteristic was the 
very reason why the government disjoined the ‘Eastern Bloc’, and refused to ask 
bailout for the non-Eurozone countries. The analysis of the Czech economic 
panorama tells more about the country’s stance in the Union, particularly vis-à-vis the 
Eurozone. Because its economy fared better, the Czech Republic underlined at 
various occasions that the situation was not identical across the NMS. With a sounder 
banking system, relatively lower inflation level and good export and manufacturing 
performance, the Czech Republic had been preparing to join the Eurozone prior to the 
crisis. The crisis not only has hindered the process by rising debt levels, but also has 
caused exchange rate fluctuation therefore macroeconomic instability. In response to 
this impediment, the government asked alleviation of entry criteria to Eurozone so as 
to solve the problem of exchange rate instability. In other words, while the refusal of 
bailout request communicated the intent to prove superiority over other non-Eurozone 
members, the demand of the alleviation of the euro access criteria aimed to improve 
domestic economic conditions.  
 
                                                 
158  European Commission,  “The Commission's economic forecast programme, THE CZECH REPUBLIC”, 
04.05.2009, the official website,  http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/pdf/2009/spring forecasts/cz_en.pdf  
159 ibid. 
160 ibid. 
 52 
Polish position in the EU was similar to Czech position at the beginning of the 
financial turmoil. Like in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia, in Poland, 
banks also were stronger than in other NMS; therefore, the financial system has 
withstood the crisis. However, domestic banks occupied only a small portion in the 
sector. The financial sector was mainly dominated by foreign banks. As the latter 
have curtailed liquidity, funding opportunities have shrunk in the country. As a result 
of tightened access to credit, the crisis has hit Polish economy’s two propellers of 
growth; that is, investments and private consumption. Nevertheless, it is worth 
reminding that according to Table 3.2.1, the decline in GDP is the smallest in Poland 
amongst non-Eurozone member states. Declining FDI and restricted access to credit 
have decreased investments. Only infrastructure investments have sustained thanks to 
EU funds and increasing government spending. Housing investments in particular, 
have faltered. Domestic demand has contracted due to rising unemployment, 
declining wages, deteriorating consumer confidence and limited access to credits. 
Decreasing demand in turn, has decelerated imports. Nevertheless, net exports have 
turned negative because of a shaper decline in exports than in imports. On the whole, 
budget made deficit by 0.3% in 2008.161 Budgetary deficit is expected to widen in 
2010 to more than 7% of the GDP, because of weakening growth and deteriorating 
labour market conditions. The situation on the real sector has in fact, worsened due to 
wage demands and increasing layoffs. Nevertheless, as Table 3.2.1 shows, the main 
challenge to the Polish economy has turned out to be the depreciation of the local 
currency. Even if the flexible exchange rate policy has cushioned local currency to 
some extent, it could not restore macroeconomic stability. Therefore, depreciation 
still is the major problem; it increases foreign debts of both households and the firms, 
discourages FDI, and triggers inflation.162 In sum, due to the contraction of exports 
and credit growth, and slowdown in economic activity, the country has found 
recession at his doorway. To avoid recession, Poland received US$20.58 billion credit 
from the IMF in May 2009. 163  Consequently, even if Poland fared well at the 
beginning of the crisis, its performance has worsened because of external factors. The 
exchange rate fluctuation causes depreciation, while depreciation fuels inflation. The 
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rising inflation distances Poland from joining the Eurozone. This panorama explains 
why Poland supported the Czech proposal of early facilitated entry to Eurozone, and 
not the Hungarian bailout proposal.  
 
Once a well performing system, Hungarian economy first has lost the 
momentum of growth after the accession; then was devastated by the financial crisis 
thus becoming the first to fall in the EU. Growth dropped by 1.2% in 2008 
immediately after the advent of the crisis, because the turmoil has arrested the three 
propellants of growth.164 As regards the first one, foreign capital inflow has dried up 
as investors withdrew their money in favour of stronger currencies. Consequently, the 
local currency has devaluated, and the cost of foreign debts has significantly 
augmented. Table 3.2.1 approves this assertion; Hungary appears to be the member 
state displaying the biggest sum of external and public debts. In response to 
depreciation, Hungary stabilised the exchange rate regime so as to rectify the foreign 
exchange swap market. 165  As a result, “government bond yields have declined, 
foreign parent banks have continued to support their subsidiaries in Hungary, and 
international reserves have increased”.166 On the other hand, access to credit getting 
more difficult, liquidity shortage has aroused. Tightened credit flow, together with 
worsening expectations, has adversely affected private consumption, the second pillar 
of growth. In response to falling domestic demand, inflation and output have slugged, 
investments have slumped thereof.  Investments have contracted in almost every 
sector; but the contraction was conspicuous particularly in manufacturing and 
construction. Only for infrastructure projects, investments have somehow sustained, 
and that thanks to EU funds. As a result, downturn has come about in all sectors; but 
the impacts were the hardest on manufacturing and the financial sector. As regards 
the third propellant, slowdown in world trade has caused diminution in both exports 
and imports. On the other hand, the decline in exports overweighing the decline in 
imports, net exports have made a negative contribution to budget. Besides, weakening 
export demand has induced further deceleration of output. Contracting output has 
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translated as decreased employment. The combination of all these factors has put 
pressure on the budget. However, thanks to the fiscal consolidation programme 
entered into force in 2008, not only has budgetary deficit not widened, but also it has 
narrowed from 5% in 2007 to 3.4% of the GDP in 2008.167 In sum, the crisis has 
caused sharp downturn in Hungarian economy. The impacts have turned out to be 
harder than elsewhere in the region, because Hungarian economy depended too much 
on foreign capital; its financial institutions were poorly regulated and less risk averse. 
Interlinks between the financial sector and the real economy have deepened the 
recession. As such, the country needed liquidity provision to prevent further 
deterioration. This urgency situation underlies the bailout demand from the IMF, the 
EU, and also the Hungarian PM’s financial assistance request prior to the EU summit 
of March 1st. 
 
On Baltic economies, the financial turmoil has also engendered recession. This 
outcome appears startling when thinking that the three countries had been recording 
better growth and inflation rates, as well as budgetary balance than other NMS. Yet, 
the crisis has devastated the Baltic states. How to explain this outcome? The reasons 
behind the downturn root in the structure of Baltic economies. To start with, the 
Baltic countries were using hard peg as exchange rate regime. This choice aimed to 
keep inflation low, to facilitate international financial integration and to ease the 
accession to Eurozone. The policy had proved successful, since the Baltics have 
attained greater growth rates than their neighbours before the crisis. However, it was 
not apt to withstand a challenge such as the 2008 crisis.168 Baltic currencies were 
adversely affected by the strong euro, unlike the currencies under flexible exchange 
regime. As a result, their external debt levels peaked with the crisis. (See Table 3.2.1) 
Debt to GDP ratio changes from 2008, to 2009 and to 2010 were as follows: In 
Lithuania from 15.6% in 2008, to 22.6% in 2009, to 31.9% in 2010; in Latvia from 
19.5% in 2008 to 34.1% in 2009, to 50% in 2010; and in Estonia from 4.8% in 2008, 
to 6.8% in 2009, to 7.8% in 2010.169 Estonia seems to be better faring, while Latvia 
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scores the worst. However, with regards to GDP growth, all the Baltics show more or 
less the same performance: In Latvia, GDP fell by 4.6% in 2008 and is expected to 
drop to 13% in 2009. In Estonia, GDP contracted by 9.7% in 2008 and is expected to 
reach 10% in 2009. Only in Lithuania, GDP grew by 3% after the crisis; however, it 
is expected to decline by 11% in 2009.170  Although GDP drop is a region-wide 
pattern, the slump from 2008 to 2009 was sharper in Latvia and Lithuania.  
 
Shrinking GDP resulted from plunging global demand and restricted credit 
flow. To remind, the propellers of Baltic growths were private consumption, 
investments, housing booms and credit flows. In line with the drop in credit flow, 
liquidity shortage has come about and investments have declined particularly in the 
housing and construction sectors. So, the housing boom, a specificity of Baltic 
economies, has come to an end. It is worth noting that investments have fallen also in 
manufacturing and transportation in Estonia.171 Limited access to credit has adversely 
affected domestic demand. Private consumption has faltered, import did so too. In 
addition, sluggish external demand has restrained exports. As a result of the decrease 
across all types of demand, inflation has been facing downward pressure; but it still 
remains high due to external factors, such escalating energy and food prices, and also 
strong wages.172 On the other hand, slowdown of economic activity reflected on the 
real sector as increasing unemployment. On the grounds of flexible labour market 
conditions, Baltic economies responded to unemployment with a cut in nominal 
wages. Lower wages, together with slumping demand, are likely to curb inflation in 
the medium term. On the whole, the crisis has arrested the miraculous Baltic growth. 
It has deflated the housing boom, and has curbed domestic demand. The reason 
behind the downturn was overheating prior to the crisis. Rapid credit growth and the 
housing boom have constituted the primary source of vulnerability, which the IMF 
report of 2008 had already warned about. Another weakness came from the fixed 
exchange rate regime. The latter has caused depreciation and instability. Finally, the 
deterioration of the international environment has adversely affected domestic 
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demand in the Baltic region, one of the main propellers of growth. Such being the 
macroeconomic panorama, the countries gave support to both ‘Eastern European’ 
demands.  
 
The downturn in Romania was no surprising; because the country, being one of 
the poorest EU members, constituted the weakest link. With the crisis, output and 
exports have contracted, while capital inflows have shrunk. In addition, the risk of 
capital outflow has come true. Accordingly, the banking system in Romania has been 
hit and liquidity shortage has aroused.173 The recession has resulted mainly from two 
phenomena, the contraction in domestic demand and exports; the two motors of 
growth so to speak. To start with, tighter credit conditions have triggered exchange 
rate depreciation, thereby devaluation of the local currency (as indicated in Table 
3.2.1). Depreciation has increased the cost of debts in foreign currency of both the 
households and firms. 174  Accordingly, domestic demand for consumption and 
investments have contracted by 2% after the crisis, versus their average increase of 
14.5% in the first three quarters of 2008.175 Depreciation also has widened budgetary 
deficits to 5.4% of GDP. The expansion resulted from lower tax revenues, and high 
government spending in the form of investments, public wages and social transfers. It 
is worth noting that by increasing public investments, government aimed to counter 
the reduction of credit flows.176 Funding by the EU, the IMF and the World Bank also 
have helped counterpoise the decline in credits. So, the deficit is expected to linger 
around 5.2% in 2009 in relation to the government’s austerity measures such as cuts 
on social spending, and on public sector wages. With regards to the second motor of 
growth, net exports maintained their positive contribution to GDP, because import 
demand has faltered more than external demand. Nevertheless, growth dropped to 
7.1% in 2008 from 6.2% in 2007; and it is expected to remain so due to shrinking 
household consumption and government expenditure curtailed by fiscal measures.177 
Slugged output also has raised unemployment levels. This economic outlook 
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explicates why Romania asked bailout from the EU and the IMF, as well as why it 
sided with the countries that formulated the financial assistance demand. 
 
In Bulgaria, another poor member of the Union, the impacts of the crisis have 
happened to be harder than expected. This was mainly because of external factors; the 
contraction in global demand and trade flows, as well as confidence erosion on the 
private sector due to worsening global financial situation and crashes in stock 
markets.178 The deterioration of the international environment has put pressure on real 
GDP. In that, slumping external demand has limited exports, one of the two 
propellers of growth. On the other hand, domestic demand did not decelerate at the 
same rate as external demand; therefore, imports have somewhat sustained. 
Accordingly, net exports have made a negative contribution to GDP.179 Furthermore, 
as capital flows have slugged, as a result of risk aversion at the global level, 
investments have declined sharply and are expected to remain so in 2010.180 In line 
with falling domestic demand, capital flows and investments, unemployment is 
expected to rise. Weaker labour demand is likely to curb nominal wages that were set 
high prior to the crisis. Finally, due to the fixed exchange rate regime, the local 
currency has depreciated; the cost of debts in foreign currency of households and 
firms has risen, which has added to the factors decreasing domestic demand. The drop 
in all types of demand has refrained inflation. So, as a result of economic slowdown, 
GDP has contracted for the first time since 1997; and is expected to slow down by 
0.5% in 2009.181 The IMF however, forecasts the contraction to be around 3.5% in 
2009.182 In addition, budgetary balance, which used to give surplus, made deficit by 
0.5% in 2009. Given economic slowdown and budgetary instability, public debts are 
expected to rise above 17% of GDP in 2010. 183  On the other hand, Bulgarian 
economy has fared well on the financial sector. The crisis has not unsettled the 
banking system, because Bulgarian banks managed to issue liquidity using their 
profits from 2008. To remind, in other countries, including the Eurozone members, 
                                                 
178 IMF, “Bulgaria—April 2009 Staff Visit: Concluding Statement of IMF Mission”, 22.04.2009, the official 
website, http://www.imf.org/external/np/ms/2009/042209.htm.  
179 European Commission,  “The Commission's economic forecast programme, BULGARIA”, 04.05.2009, the 
official website, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/pdf/2009/springforecasts/bg_en.pdf.  
180 ibid. 
181 ibid.  
182 “Bulgaria—April 2009 Staff Visit: Concluding Statement of IMF Mission”, op.cit. 
183 “The Commission's economic forecast programme, BULGARIA”, op.cit. 
 58 
governments had undertaken bank capitalisation.184  In sum, even if Bulgaria has 
circumvented the liquidity problem owing to its sounder banking sector, the country 
has been witnessing slowdown of economic activity, and external and internal 
imbalances thereof. The ongoing recession is likely to persist in the immediate future. 
So, Bulgaria has not arisen as a leading figure in the advocacy of the two ‘Eastern 
European’ demands; because it was relatively a younger and weaker member. It yet 
provided support because of the recession at home.  
  
So far, the section has scrutinised the worldwide, EU-wide and region-wide 
impacts of the crisis. The analysis has established that decline in growth and trade, 
depreciation and fall in stock markets were the region-wide implications. Even if all 
NMS received these impacts, damages have occurred at different levels. The gravity 
of the implications depended on domestic factors, and particularly on those 
underlying growth. Table 3.2.2 summarises the NMS specific implications across 
economic areas.  
Table 3.2.2 
Country
Private 
Consumption
Investments Credit Flow/FDI Exports
Financial 
Institutions
High 
Inflation
Unemployment
Exchange 
Rate 
Depreciation
Baltic States X X X X X X X
Slovenia X X X X X
Slovakia X X X X X
Czech Republic X X X X X
Poland X X X X X X
Hungary X X X X X X X
Bulgaria X X X X X X
Romania X X X X X X X X
The Most Damaged Economic Areas by NMS
 
 
The countries that were the worst hit were the ones with a weak financial 
system. The weakness stemmed from “badly run local banks with loosely overseen 
subsidiaries of Western ones”.185  Even if poor regulation and risk taking helped 
attract a considerable amount of foreign capital, thereby foster growth prior to the 
crisis, they have proved to be fatal once foreign investors withdrew their money. 
Hungary and Romania fall into this category. In contrast the countries with a sounder 
banking system, namely the Czech Republic, the Baltic states, Bulgaria, Poland, 
Slovenia and Slovakia, have circumvented this risk. A comparison of Bulgaria to 
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Romania is particularly illustrating at this point. Both countries displayed similar 
characteristics, such as a small size economy with poor income per capita, 
dependence on credit flow etc. However, because its banking system was better 
regulated and more risk averse, financial difficulties were not the reason behind the 
downturn in Bulgaria. Bulgaria has undergone recession, because plunging external 
demand has incised its exports, and impoverished credit flows has curbed domestic 
demand. In effect, in line the IMF thesis; the vulnerability for Bulgaria was its being a 
small size economy depending too much on exports. Secondly, the economies using 
fixed exchange rate regime have had problems with trade, domestic demand and 
inflation, because of the strong position of euro. The Baltic states and Bulgaria 
embody this strand. Exchange rate regime has been particularly fatal for the Baltics; 
their debt levels have rocketed. Thirdly, the countries where credit flow created 
housing booms have experienced high debt levels and decline in domestic demand. 
Again, the Baltic states and Bulgaria exemplify the trait. In sum, the countries 
displaying one or more of these vulnerabilities have been the worst damaged by the 
crisis; namely, the Baltic members, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania. In contrast, the 
countries applying stable macroeconomic policies before the crisis have performed 
better. Slovakia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, and Poland to some extent, appear in 
this category. Notwithstanding the decline in exports and in output and high inflation, 
the countries exhibit some crucial strengths; sounder financial institutions, flexible 
exchange regime, and growth propelled by domestic demand. In addition to these 
strengths, the Czech Republic and Poland have enjoyed the advantage of being larger 
size economies. In that, even if their growth depended also on exports, the Czech 
Republic and Poland hedged collapse unlike Bulgaria. On the other hand, Slovenia 
and Slovakia were small size economies; but they profited from the comparative 
advantages is of Eurozone membership vis-à-vis the other NMS.  
 
Of this lengthy analysis, this chapter draws three conclusions. Firstly, despite 
region-wide macroeconomic trends, the NMS performances were different before and 
after the accession. They all displayed domestic vulnerabilities, but of dissimilar kind. 
As a result, not all NMS were devastated by the crisis. That means, the German 
argument as to which the situation was not the same for all Central and Eastern 
European states was accurate. It further means that the decision to bail out on a case-
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by-case basis fell in line with the macroeconomic realities in the region. Secondly, the 
type and the gravity of domestic problems at home have determined the stance of a 
member state in the Union. Those suffering from exchange regime problems 
supported early facilitated entry demand, those with high debts and liquidity shortage 
asked bailouts. Thirdly, because the impacts of the crisis have been worse in some 
NMS, those who performed better, namely Poland and the Czech Republic, attempted 
to distinguish themselves from the weaker ones. It thus has become clear that an 
‘Eastern Bloc’ does not exist. The NMS race with each other to promote to the level 
of the old members. Only, the domination of the interests of the old members gives 
the incentive to form an ‘Eastern coalition’ in an attempt to counterpoise the West-
inclined balance of power. Nevertheless, this chapter has affirmed that, on the whole, 
the macroeconomic impacts of the crisis have been harder in Central and Eastern 
Europe than in the Eurozone. On the other hand, the crisis has produced also social 
and political problems, which, since the beginning of 2009, have been escalating on 
the agendas of the EU and other international instances such as G20, the IMF or WB. 
Given the importance of this aspect, this thesis proceeds to an analysis of the social 
and political implications of the crisis in the region. 
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Chapter IV  
THE SOCIAL IMPACTS OF THE CRISIS ON CENTRAL 
AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES  
 
This chapter examines the non-economic impacts of the crisis on Central and 
Eastern Europe. The term ‘non-economic’ designates social, political and ethnic costs 
of the crisis. The chapter is sectioned in two parts. The first part dwells upon the 
social and political implications of the crisis. The objective is to reveal the way in 
which social dissatisfaction with the situation in the country was channelled, and 
whether, and if so, how the polity responded to the various expressions of social 
discontent. The analysis covers the period from the outbreak of the crisis to April 
2009. The data is collected mostly from media; therefore, the research materials 
encompass dossiers, newspaper articles and so forth. 
IV. I. Socio-political Costs of the Crisis 
 
This part elaborates on social and political costs of the crisis. To start with, the 
financial collapse has instigated social and political instability everywhere across the 
EU; protests and rallies have been channelling discontent in both Western and Eastern 
Europe since the beginning of 2009. The objective is to identify the patterns of social 
and political costs, and whether, if ever, they concentrate in particular areas in the 
region. To this end, this section undertakes a country-specific analysis covering the 
period from January 2009 to April 2009. It is hypothesised that social costs have been 
the highest in the countries where the macroeconomic impacts have been the hardest. 
 
After the IMF bailout, the Latvian government has cut down on budget to 
restore the economy. The government decreased wages of civil servants by 1/3; 
increased VAT to 21%, and closed down some schools and hospitals. These measures 
have created intense discontent and have eroded trust in the government. On January 
13, “thousands of people protested in Riga, Latvia, demanding snap elections and the 
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resignation of the government in the face of a deepening economic crisis”. 186 
Demonstrators protested the up to $3 billion burden imposed on taxpayers as a result 
of the collapse and nationalisation of the biggest Latvian bank, Parex. The riot also 
was a reaction to the Parliament’s decision on budgetary cuts which would shrink 
state employees’ wages by up to 15%.187 In the street battles, more than 40 people got 
hurt, and 106 people were arrested. The Latvian President explained the uprising by 
declining trust in state authority as a result of the public perception that the chain of 
events starting with the IMF bailout has caused ‘national humiliation’. On January 21, 
more than 200 farmers gathered in Valmiera to protest the crisis in farming business. 
“Farmers demanded monthly loans that were being on hold for one year, and a 
temporary ban on the banks’ right to increase interest rates on loans to farmers.”188 
Protests continued in February. On February 3, farmers gathered to demand the 
resignation of the minister, and higher prices for milk.189 The continuous protests 
compelled the Latvian PM to resign on February 20. Hence, the Latvian government 
became the second to resign because of the implications of the crisis.190 On April 2, 
“over 10 000 teachers blocked the streets of Riga to protest against government plans 
to cut funds for education and decrease public-sector wages by up to 40%”.191 The 
demonstration, led by Latvian Education and Science Workers Association, gathered 
teachers from all over the country.  
 
In Lithuania, discontent has aroused as a result of the government decision to 
cut expenditure in the public sector, on social security and on subsidies for medicine 
and heating, and to raise taxes. On January 16, three national trade unions launched a 
“general protest action in front of the parliament and government buildings under the 
slogan ‘Stop impoverishment and unemployment, stop disruption of business, stop 
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the extermination of sports, press and culture”.192 The unions’ actions turned into a 
riot. Some demonstrators threw stones to parliament; police expelled them by using 
teargas.193 The protesters demanded that social and economic policies target the most 
disadvantaged groups during the recession period. The trade unions on the other hand, 
dissociated themselves from the rioters and submitted a list of requirements to the 
government. On April 4, police officers, firefighters and border guards made a protest 
march for better pay and against cuts in social spending in the capital city.194  
 
Violent demonstrations also took place in Bulgaria. In January, student 
organisations, environmentalists and trade organisations organised a three days rally 
where they voiced in total 19 demands, such as better education, fight against 
corruption and mafia, better agricultural policies etc. On January 14, around 2000 
people protested against the government. Violent clashes occurred as protestors threw 
stones. Around 17 protestors and six police officers were injured. Police arrested 
more than 50 protestors. Demonstrations continued on January 15 and 16; yet without 
violence and less participation.195 In February, police officers vowed to protest until 
the government improved their wages and working conditions. On February 4, 
farmers made a huge demonstration to protest against low milk prices. The protestors 
also opposed the government’s import of cheap milk from other EU member states.196 
Around 100 farmers blocked a key border crossing point to Romania. For March, 
leaders of the student protests had already scheduled in December a demonstration to 
take place after the adjournment of parliamentary sessions.197 About 2000 people 
protested the government in Sofia. The group encompassed students who accused the 
government for failing to ensure security, and farmers who objected to corruption and 
low prices for their produce. The gas crisis with Russia and Ukraine constituted 
another factor that fuelled discontent with government. Protesters distanced 
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themselves from any partisan allegiance. On March 15, thousands of police officers 
marched in Sofia to demand a 50% wage rise and better working conditions.198 A 
wave of strikes by Bulgarian steel mill workers took place throughout March and 
April. The latest wave on April 29, gathered about 1000 workers who protested over 
unpaid salaries and demanded help from the government for their ailing plant. The 
rally voiced dissatisfaction with the government’s failure to raise living standards, 
corruption and mismanagement of the crisis.199 Trade unions in fact, had been calling 
on Economy Minister to resign. Teachers and doctors also announced that they would 
join the steel mill workers’ protests.200 
 
In Romania, various protests took place against job insecurity and government 
policies. On January 13, thousands of workers from car industry companies linked to 
the Dacia-Renault, made demonstrations to support the government tax for importing 
second-hand cars to Romania. Workers also protested the continual production break 
that the company had decided one month ago, and demanded job guarantee.201 The 
company management had declared in January that they were considering reduction 
of the workforce by a ¼ due to the slumping demand. On the public sector side, the 
situation was not brilliant either. On 9 February, some 500 members of researchers’ 
trade unions organised a protest march against the governments’ reduction of the 
R&D budget.202 On April 29, about 6000 employees from state-run railway company, 
CFR, protested government plans to cut down up to 12 000 jobs. The Transport 
Ministry denied the claim of layoff, and averred they instead planned to decrease 
salaries.203 The government then announced wage freeze in public sector on April 28, 
to which the main teachers’ union replied by a strike announce. 
 
In Poland, the All-Poland Trade Union of Physicians launched a protest action 
on 5 January 2009 against the government plan to reduce financing for medical 
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services provided in hospitals. “Trade union activists put up posters in about 80 
hospitals in which the trade union is represented, proclaiming ‘I pay 10% more for 
health and receive 10% less. Give me my money back’.”204 The protests continued 
throughout January. The deterioration of economic situation intensified social 
discontent in March. On March 6, up to 10 000 workers, mainly from the arms 
industry, protested against looming layoffs after the government cut down on defence 
budget.205 Discontent also gained miners. About 65 000 coal miners from the state 
run and operated Kompania Weglowa, Europe’s largest coal producer, went on strike, 
in mid March, to protest low wages. On March 26, about 1000 workers including coal 
miners and shipyard workers marched through Warsaw. Protestors burned tyres and 
threw firecrackers to protest the government’s economic policy, layoffs in public 
sector in particular. The protesters exclaimed they did not want to pay for the crisis.206 
On April 29, shipyard trade unions protested EU-mandated closures in the Polish 
shipbuilding sector in Warsaw. Violent clashes took place between demonstrators and 
police; several people were injured; and police used tear gas and rubber batons 
against demonstrators throwing firecrackers and burning wheels.207 The unions also 
channelled their dissatisfaction with the government’s too liberal policies. Another 
branch of the group made demonstrations in Brussels in front of the European 
Commission to protest the latter’s decision to rule out Polish state aid to shipyards, on 
the grounds that it had breached competition rules, and had produced a major 
restructuring that would cost thousands of job losses.208 
 
In Hungary, the farming subsidies issue was troublesome. On February 16, 
farmers launched a 10-day protest by blocking the country’s major roads to demand 
greater subsidies, and measures against imported products sold at below-market 
prices. Upon the government’s approval, farmers ended their protest on February 
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25.209 Several thousand people made an anti-government protest on March 15. The 
demonstration took upon a violent tone when some protestors tried to attack police 
lines; police used tear gas to strike them back. 35 people were detained.210 On March 
21, the socialist government resigned amid battles over spending cuts. The Socialist 
leader, in power since 2004, recognised the decline of his popularity due to tax hikes 
and spending cut; and expressed that he considered himself a hindrance to further 
economic and social reforms.211 The new PM, who was Mr Bajnai, a non-aligned 
figure who had been serving as the economy minister, was invested in mid April. 
Following the investiture, several thousand people made protestations against the new 
PM’s plan to implement tough austerity measures in Budapest. A group of protesters 
on motorbikes drove into a police cordon and police used teargas.212 On April 27, the 
Liga trade union confederation called for a nationwide strike on May 8 to protest 
against the economic programme of the new PM. The PM however, affirmed that he 
saw no “chance to change his crisis management programme”.213 On 30 April, Free 
Union of Railway Workers (VDSZSZ), representing about a ¼ of all railway 
employees, announced an 18 hour strike. Union finds the governments’ plans 
unacceptable.214  
 
Economic situation was more brilliant in the Czech Republic; yet the country 
did not go unaffected by the wave of discontent. On March 2, around 500 workers 
from the troubled glass giant Bohemia Crystalex Trading protested against the 
government’s lack of action towards the company’s bankruptcy and unpaid salaries. 
Wages were unpaid since September 2008, as many factories bankrupted due to the 
slumping demand for exports. 215  The protesters demanded extraordinary social 
benefits from the government. 216  In addition, on March 12, over 8000 farmers 
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gathered to protest against low prices, and the EU’s distribution of subsidies.217 
Farmers from Slovakia, Hungary, Lithuania and Slovakia also participated in the 
rally.218 Dairy farmers again made a demonstration on April 29, for fair milk prices 
and better conditions. To the rally, some 25 000 dairy farmers coming from all over 
Europe took part. 219  On April 29, Czech truckers rallied to protest against the 
outgoing PM’s failure to introduce toll rebates. The government replied by pointing at 
high oil prices and the strong euro.220 The Czech Republic did not undergo violent 
uprising; nevertheless discontent was intense enough to result in cabinet change. On 
March 24, the government collapsed after losing a vote of no-confidence tabled by 
the opposition Social Democrats. 221  The Social Democrats were criticising the 
government’s economic decision in the face of the crisis. Hence, the Czech 
government became the third cabinet to collapse in Central and Eastern Europe after 
the crisis.  
 
As regards the Eurozone members, none of them were unsettled by social 
unrest, except violent demonstrations in Greece. In Slovakia, no protest or 
demonstration took place. In Slovenia, no uprising occurred but the government’s 
measures to face the crisis caused controversy with trade unions and public servants, 
none of them were yet violent. In the face of the crisis, the government raised debt to 
€2.8 billion in 2009.222 It introduced a temporary reduction of salaries in the public 
sector.223 It yet, showed solidarity with people by decreasing salaries of ministers and 
state secretaries.224  The pay cut issue instigated judges to go on strike to protest 
against the government’s pay offer in March.225 In January, Slovenia’s biggest union 
confederation, ZSSS, made a peaceful protest in front of the parliament against the 
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government bill on subsidies to companies introducing a shortened working week due 
to crisis.226 The unions demanded subsidies to extend. ZSSS extended its demands 
over welfare issues in the following months. On January 28, ZSSS issued a proposal 
on changes to the employment and insurance against unemployment acts, and to the 
social security act. 227  In February, it opposed the government’s cutting sickness 
benefit rights.228 In April, the union confederation made a demonstration to protest 
against the government’s policy regarding pensions.229 On the private sector side, 
about 250 workers of the rail vehicle assembly plant STS, linked to German group 
Siemens, protested against the company’s plans to close the plant down on January 
29.230  
 
In sum, the deterioration of the socioeconomic conditions after the crisis has 
engendered social discontent across Europe. People made demonstrations and/or went 
on strike to protest against job insecurity and dwindling welfare benefits. However, 
social discontent took the form of social unrest in the countries where the 
macroeconomic impacts have been the hardest. In effect, violent protests and rallies 
took place in Hungary, Latvia, Romania, Bulgaria and Lithuania. The governments of 
Hungary and Latvia had to resign in the face of intense social discontent. On the other 
hand, Poland and the Czech Republic, which have better survived the crisis, also 
witnessed protests and demonstrations. These actions however, were not of a violent 
nature. Nevertheless, the population was discontent of worsening conditions and 
tough economic measures. The measures cost the governments their popularity. The 
escalating discontent in the Czech Republic urged the PM to resign. As such, the 
Czech Republic became the first country holding presidency whose leadership lacked 
support. The Eurozone countries did not exhibit any violent uprising. Economic 
measures created tensions between government and trade unions, which is a trait of 
democracy. The costs of the crisis did not yet limit to socioeconomic features. In 
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some new member states, ethnic violence has intensified in the aftermath of the crisis, 
which will be the subject of the next section.  
 
IV. II. Ethnic Costs of the Crisis in Hungary and the Czech 
Republic 
 
This section deepens the analysis of human cost to the ethnic level. The 
objective is to identify the mechanisms whereby economic adversities have 
transformed into ethnic violence, and whether this type of cost displays a geographic 
pattern. 
 
In the aftermath of the crisis, social unrest has manifested itself, also, through 
violence against ethnic minorities in the Czech Republic and Hungary. The Roma 
community became a conspicuous target. Notwithstanding that anti-Roma feeling is 
manifold, which economics constitutes but one aspect, many argue that the crisis has 
rekindled the anti-Roma feeling.231 To start with, the Roma constitute a group whose 
situation were one of the most deteriorated amongst the society, as they fall within the 
poorest segments of the society across Europe. World Bank report of 2003 defines the 
Roma as “the most prominent poverty group in many of the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe. Roma are both poorer than other groups, and are more likely to fall 
into poverty and remain poor. (…) poverty rates are particularly high in Bulgaria, 
Hungary and Romania.”232 World Bank Report of 2006 reaffirms the finding; the 
Roma were “one of the largest and poorest and fastest growing minorities in 
Europe.”233  
 
Secondly, “poverty among Roma is multidimensional, related to low education 
levels, poor health status, high unemployment, inadequate housing, and compounded 
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by widespread exclusion and discrimination within society.”234 The 2006 report adds 
that “living conditions of Roma have deteriorated disproportionately compared to 
other groups. They were affected by restructuring following the economic transition 
in the 1990s”. 235  Poverty among Roma has increased due to the closure or 
privatization of the large state companies. Since most of them are poorly educated 
and unskilled workers, their employment opportunities are scarce. As a result, most 
Roma depend on welfare benefits. However, welfare services towards this group have 
been underperforming in Eastern Europe. In the Czech Republic and Slovakia, 
Romani children face segregation in schools; they are sent to schools for children 
with mental disabilities, “despite a ruling by the European Court of Human Rights in 
November 2007 that it amounted to unlawful discrimination”.236 As such children 
receive poor education, hence having access to limited job opportunities. In Romania, 
the Roma suffer from poor housing. They live in barracks exposed to adverse weather 
conditions and poor health conditions.  
In Bulgaria, the Roma are deprived of medical and social assistance. The 
European Committee of Social Rights condemned Bulgaria for violation of the 
European Social Charter on April 5, 2009, with regards to these issues.237  
 
Thirdly, the Roma face discrimination in almost every aspect of social life. The 
EU Minorities and Discrimination Survey of 2008 qualifies the Roma as the group 
with “the highest overall levels of being discriminated against of all groups surveyed 
for EUMIDIS.”238 According to EU report, the Roma face discrimination in looking 
for work; at work; in looking for a house or an apartment to rent or buy; by healthcare 
personnel; by social service personnel; by school personnel; at a café, restaurant, bar 
or club; when entering or in a shop; and when trying to open a bank account or get a 
loan. In line with these findings, World Bank Report of 2006 notes that the Roma 
“are often the first to be laid off from jobs, and have been persistently blocked from 
re-entering the labour force due to low skill and education levels, and 
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discrimination.”239  Before the crisis, Roma immigrants had been providing cheap 
labour in the market, thereby had been contributing to housing booms. 240  As 
mortgages have crashed after the crisis and industries have set about laying off, most 
Roma lost their jobs.  
 
On the other hand, the Roma experience criminal victimisation, including 
racially motivated crime, in five different areas; namely, theft of or from a vehicle; 
burglary or attempted burglary; theft of personal property not involving force or 
threat; assault and threat; serious harassment. In addition, the survey identifies that 
discrimination and ethnic violence are more widespread than recorded in official 
statistics. The level of discrimination is the highest in the Czech Republic (64%); and 
the lowest in Bulgaria (26%) and Romania (25%). Hungary scores (62%) in the 
survey.241  
 
To fight poverty and unemployment thereby to enable social integration of the 
Roma, social policies to build skills and to improve education have proved crucial. 
However, governments, in the aftermath of the crisis, were busy channelling 
resources to stimulate businesses and the financial sector; hence the already restricted 
level of social spending (such as education, aids to large families and to the long term 
unemployed and programmes designed to fight social inclusion) in national budgets 
has further dwindled. The Czech Republic is a conspicuous example; funds for 
teaching assistance programmes to Roma children have dropped to a large extent.  
 
Right after the outbreak of the financial crisis, attacks against the Roma 
resurged in Eastern Europe. In the Czech Republic, on 17 November, 500 black-
masked people voicing racist slogans tried to attack a Roma ghetto in Litvinov, a 
town in the north of the country characterised by high unemployment rate, 12%- 
which equates to double the national average.242 On November 21, extreme right 
protesters, backed by the nationalist Czech Workers Party and members of the town’s 
dominant white community, had street battles with police. 14 people were injured. On 
                                                 
239  “Development Outreach”, op.cit., p.30. 
240  Mark, David, “The picture is grim for Europe's Roma”, EU Observer, 09.12.2008, 
http://euobserver.com/851/27250  
241 “EU Minorities and Discrimination Survey”, op.cit., p.8. 
242 Winfrey, Michael, “ANALYSIS-Racist violence flares in Central and Eastern Europe”, Reuters Alter 4et, 
21.11.2008, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/LJ27455.htm  
 72 
April 4, around 500 extreme right supporters organized a march through the Roma-
populated area in Přerov. Participants to the rally shouted slogans against “gypsy 
terrorism”, and defined the Roma as “parasitic”.243 The demonstrators attacked police 
with stones, petrol bombs, and firecrackers. The violence spread into the surrounding 
streets. The police could secure the Roma-populated neighbourhood with tanks, 
police vans and riot police. On April 18, molotov cocktails were thrown on domiciles 
in the village of Vítkov.244 Czech PM Topolanek explained ethnic violence through 
the financial crisis. “The crisis could also exacerbate strife in areas left behind in the 
economic boom. It is tied to... economic worsening not only in the Czech Republic, 
but also in the rest of Europe, because attacks have happened in a number of other 
countries. There is unrest in society.”245 
 
In Hungary, attacks on the Roma were the most intense. On November 3, two 
Roma people were shot dead in Nagycsecs, in north east of the country. 246  On 
November 4, four other Roma were killed; the murders were attributed to extreme 
rightists.247 By the end of 2008, more than seven Roma had been killed while Roma 
homes had received around 30 Molotov cocktail attacks.248 Attacks have intensified 
in 2009. On February 23, two Roma people were shot as they were trying to flee their 
home, which was set on fire in Tatárszentgyörgy, a small town in the south east of 
Budapest.249 On March 2, two more Roma were killed in Tatárszentgyörgy.250 On 
April 22, two Roma people were shot dead, and his two others were seriously injured 
following a bombed attack on their home.251 On April 29, a Roma man was shot dead 
in Tiszaloek, a town in the northeast of Budapest.252 Budapest Times reports at least 
16 other attacks on Roma homes in one year, and that only in one case the perpetrator 
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was brought to justice.253 The Hungarian President, on February 28, averred that the 
crisis had increased the urgency for Hungary to change the treatment of its Roma 
population after a series of attacks on the minority.254 To comprehend the correlation 
between ethnic violence and the crisis, it is necessary to look at the social conditions 
in which the Roma live.  
 
The largest Roma communities are located in the deprived areas of northern and 
eastern Hungary. In such regions, the Roma usually live in ghettos on the 
periphery.255 The ghettos often host unemployed, welfare-dependent and uneducated 
Romas. The Roma are seen as a burden on the society. According to Robert Kushen, 
the director of the Budapest-based European Roma Rights Centre, “people accuse the 
Gypsies of living off the system; in good economic times, that leads to resentment. 
With the economy going south, it has led to rising tensions”.256 So, the missing link 
between the crisis and ethnic violence is welfare deprivation and its financing. The 
crisis has exacerbated the problem by further trimming the already poor job 
opportunities. As mentioned earlier, this segment of the population was first to be laid 
off. Their chances to find a job have slimmed down as most of them are unskilled 
workers, and because of discrimination.  
 
One reason why the Roma are scapegoated concerns the conviction that most 
crimes are committed by the Roma. The Roma are accused for most robberies and 
murders; they are stopped by the police and asked for their papers nine times more 
than other Hungarians.257 The lack of ethnic monitoring in the country prevents the 
corroboration of this conviction on Roma criminality.258 The extreme rightwing party 
Jobbik and its paramilitary group the “Hungarian Guard”, founded in 2007, have been 
accentuating the issues of “gypsy crime” and public security since the outbreak of the 
crisis. Jobbik and the Hungarian Guard, which argue the safeguard of Hungarian 
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identity, culture and traditions,259 picture the Roma as petty criminals who drain on 
social welfare systems. In December 2008, they held a rally against “gypsy crime” in 
Tiszalok and Tatárszentgyörgy. One rightwing protester of the rally, Istvan Kovacs, 
told IPS that “if they take welfare benefits and don’t work, they are more likely to 
keep stealing from people.”260 It is noteworthy that using this issue has helped Jobbik 
boost its support near the 5% threshold for seats in Parliament in 2010.261 In short, the 
Roma have been disproportionately hit by the crisis in economic terms; they also 
have been experiencing security problems.  
 
Insecurity and welfare deprivation urged most Roma in the Czech Republic to 
seek asylum from Canada. In 2008, Canada received around 853 of such application, 
of them 84 obtained the status. Canada, reluctant to accept all these immigrants, 
called on Czech authorities to take measures to prevent Romani asylum claimants 
from arriving in Canada. 262  Also, Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board, an 
independent tribunal that evaluates refugee claims, sent a fact-finding mission to the 
Czech Republic in March to assess living conditions for Roma.263 The status of the 
Czech Romani asylum was discussed at the Canada-EU summit of May 6. 
 
The consecutive attacks on the Roma in Eastern Europe brought up the Roma 
question at the EU summit on December 11. The leaders decided to draw up an EU 
Framework Strategy for Roma Inclusion in an attempt to develop policies, and to 
improve coordination, monitoring, and evaluation between member states. 
 
In sum, the financial crisis has exacerbated ethnic tension in Eastern Europe due 
to the deterioration of economic conditions and welfare standards. The Roma became 
the conspicuous target because of, mainly, welfare-dependence. The community has 
faced intensified attacks by extreme rightist who perceived the community as a 
burden on the society. The already existing ethnic prejudices have sustained the 
                                                 
259 Kulish, Nicholas, “Hungarian Extremists Reflect Discontent, and Add to It”, the 4ew York Times, 24.10.2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/24/world/europe/24hungary.html   
260  Dujisin, Zoltán, “Roma Pay the Price for Far-Right Rise”, Inter Press Service, IPS, 29.12.2008, 
http://ipsnews.net/print.asp?idnews=45242   
261 Kulish, op.cit. 
262 European Roma Rights Center, “Rights Coalition Calls on Canada to Take a Leading Role in Protecting Czech 
Roma from Persecution”, the official website, 05.05.2009m, http://www.errc.org/cikk.php?cikk=3031  
263  “Canada calls on Czech govt to stop Roma refugees”, Aktualne, 16.04.2009, 
http://aktualne.centrum.cz/czechnews/clanek.phtml?id=634843  
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welfare argument. Although discrimination towards the Roma has been widespread in 
the region, the most frequent attacks occurred in the Czech Republic and Hungary. 
Particularly in Hungary, ethnic violence was the most intense. That Hungary was the 
country that was the worst hit by the crisis strengthens the thesis that the crisis has 
created ethnic tension in society due to welfare deprivation. On the other hand, this 
thesis falls short to explain why ethnic violence has exacerbated in the Czech 
Republic that has showed a relatively good crisis management performance. The 
Czech exception therefore, is illustrating for exposing the limits of economic 
explanations. Comparative politics, anthropology or sociology certainly, have more to 
say in this regard.   
 
Let us now recapitulate the main findings of this chapter. As the financial crisis 
has spread over the real sector, people’s daily lives were affected. Layoffs, wage cuts 
and uncertainty have instigated social discontent in Europe. Dissatisfaction was 
channelled mainly by protests, strikes and demonstrations in the Union. However, in 
the non-Eurozone countries where economy was hardly hit, these forms of 
protestation turned into violent clashes, riots and attacks on ethnic groups. Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania fall into this category. The heavier were the 
macroeconomic impacts of the crisis the more violent were the contestations. In 
effect, in the NMS that have better withstood the crisis, social discontent was not of a 
violent nature. Countries such as Slovenia, Slovakia or the Czech Republic exemplify 
this group. On the other hand, the crisis fuelling social dissatisfaction has aroused 
political instability in the region; which the collapse of three NMS governments 
illustrates. The change of cabinet occurred in the countries where the macroeconomic 
and social impacts of the crisis were the hardest. Latvia and Hungary feature in this 
category. Finally, the crisis has rekindled the dormant ethnic hostilities. Although 
hostility was widespread, in Hungary and the Czech Republic it took the form of 
violent attacks against ethnic minorities. The finding on Hungary suggests that ethnic 
costs were the highest in the countries where the macroeconomic, social and political 
costs were the highest. On the other hand, the Czech Republic is an outlier in various 
respects. The country performed well in the crisis; still it has undergone cabinet 
change and ethnic violence, but not social contestation of a violent nature. As such, 
the Czech Republic makes a rather interesting case study. However, its explanation 
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requires some deeper political, economic, sociological and historical analyses that 
pass beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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Chapter V 
CONCLUSION 
This thesis has analysed the impacts of the 2008 financial crisis on EU 
integration and solidarity. The objective was to identify the state actors’ and the 
Commission’s reactions to the crisis, in the context of multilevel governance, 
whereby to understand whether the Union could withstand the turmoil in unity and 
solidarity. The main hypothesis of the thesis was that the EU’s economic and 
financial solidarity was vulnerable to individual interests of member states, and 
particularly to those of France, Germany, Italy and Britain. The hypothesis was tested 
at two levels, the EU level and the state level, states referring to the new member 
states.  
 
The first chapter of the thesis dwelled upon the EU level actions. It sought to 
identify whether the EU actors could develop a common coordinated EU level 
strategy in coping with the crisis. The analysis concluded that the EU actors 
developed, in relatively a short period of time, a common action plan, the European 
Economic Recovery Plan, and guidelines alongside. The process was kicked off by 
the state actors, upon the cues given by France, Germany, Britain and Italy. The 
EERP and the accompanying common measures were compiled in such a way that 
they would address mostly the problems on the Eurozone economies. This outcome 
produced two types of problem in the Union. Firstly, during the implementation 
period, France attempted to adopt a protectionist bailout plan, thereby to break EU 
solidarity and the competition rules in the market because of domestic interests. This 
initiative was aborted, mainly, upon contestations by other member states whose 
interests would be undermined by the French bailout plan. This example has 
demonstrated, first, poor coordination within the Union, second, the weakness of EU 
solidarity. This is an important finding of the thesis as one of the founding members 
has created a major setback to European economic integration by protecting its 
individual interests. The other problem that emerged in this process was the divide 
between the Eurozone and non-Eurozone members. Because common measures and 
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the EERP only partly addressed problems in the context of Central and Eastern 
Europe, the non-Eurozone members asked additional financial assistance from the 
EU, and early facilitated accession to Euro area. The Commission and the Eurozone 
members declined both demands for economic reasons. As a result, the new member 
states contested the decision on the grounds of inequality between member states. The 
old members revised the first demand at the European Council meeting of March 20, 
2009, by deciding to bail out countries in turmoil on a case-by-case basis. This chain 
of events indicated three main conclusions with regards to the Union’s governance. 
Firstly, the concerns of the old members mark EU level actions. In other words, the 
powerful members influence EU level policies that would apply to all members. 
Secondly, it has thus become apparent that there is a divide between the old and new 
member states. Thirdly, neither the old members nor the new member states always 
stick together; mainly because member states decide to support or disjoin their peers 
according to the needs and problems at the domestic level. On the other hand, the 
predomination of decision making by Western members gives the new member states 
incentive for acting together. All these patterns are of a nature to oppugn the 
solidarity claim in the Union, thereby to support the main hypothesis that EU 
solidarity is vulnerable to the individual interests of the older members, precisely 
those of Germany, Italy, France and Britain. The conflicts of interests in the EU 
decision making process communicate that the new member states are not yet as 
powerful as to counterpoise the weight of the old members. In other words, the 
already existing pattern of ‘predomination by France, Germany, Italy and Britain’ has 
not altered after the Eastern enlargement. The crisis has thus exposed that economic 
integration and financial solidarity were vulnerable to domestic interests of state 
actors; and those of the four old members in particular. This finding is revealing to 
demonstrate the limits of integration.  
 
The second chapter considered the impacts of the crisis in the context of Central 
and Eastern Europe. The objective was to gauge the extent to which the EU level 
actions have satisfied the needs and have remedied the problems in the new member 
states context. The analysis established that the crisis has showed an uneven impact 
on the new member states economies; some members were hit more than others both 
economically and politically. The countries that were the hardest hit were Hungary, 
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Latvia, Bulgaria, followed by other Baltic states and Romania. The other members 
circumvented collapse thanks to, mainly, sounder macroeconomic policies that they 
had adopted prior to the crisis. Thus, one of the key findings of the thesis was that the 
reason motivating the Eurozone members’ objection to a region-wide bailout plan 
was accurate; the situation was not as bad everywhere as it was in, say, Hungary. 
However, the study also uncovered that the crisis has engendered deeper problems in 
the new member state economies. The Eurozone members in fact, have enjoyed the 
advantages of using euro and of having more industrialised and wealthier economies. 
In contrast, the non-Eurozone members not only were deprived of the advantages of 
the Western member, but also had little to gain from common measures. As a result, 
they formulated additional demands from the EU. In other words, the domestic needs 
and problems have orientated the new member states’ position within the EU, 
meaning vis-à-vis the old members and their peers. On the other hand, the crisis has 
channelled social dissatisfaction with the domestic economic and political situation 
across Europe. However, this dissatisfaction also varied with respect to the impact of 
the crisis on individual members. The countries whose economies were the hardest hit 
saw the highest level of popular discontent. In the countries where economic situation 
was worse, discontent took the form of social unrest, but of a violent nature. In the 
new member states where economic performance was better, protests were intense 
but not violent. So, in a way, social costs were shaped by economic damages; where 
the latter were heavier, the former scored high. In addition, poor crisis management 
performance led to government instability as illustrated by the collapse of four 
governments in the new member states by the end of the first quarter of 2009. Finally, 
the crisis seems to have enkindled the dormant ethnic hostilities in the new member 
states. Welfare deprivation aggravated by the crisis has instigated attacks on the 
Roma communities in Eastern Europe. Ethnic violence was particularly intense and 
frequent in Hungary and the Czech Republic. The case of Hungary strengthens the 
validity thesis that economic deprivation is likely to engender social and ethnic costs. 
In contrast, the Czech case weakens the claim since the Czech Republic is one of the 
best performing new member states in the fight against the crisis. In other words, the 
fragile political situation in most new member stats was prone to instability and 
ethnic strife partly as a result of economic problems caused by the financial crisis.  
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So, this thesis argues that the findings are important for shedding new light onto 
the integration literature, as well as on the literature on International Relations. 
Firstly, they reaffirm the already existing claim that EU governance is dominated by 
the relatively more powerful members, more specifically by France, Germany, Britain 
and Italy. The Eastern enlargements have expanded the size of the Union; but the 
crisis has showed that the balance of power amongst the member states has not much 
altered. The disequilibrium arouses criticism by the new member states about 
inequality in the EU. This finding falls in line with the assumptions of the neorealist 
theories of International Relations stating that the interests of the more powerful 
states overweigh the interests of the relatively weaker states, and that the former are 
more influential in shaping world politics than others. Secondly, state actors turn to 
EU level actions when they need to. When national interests conflict with the EU 
level strategies member states attempt to break solidarity and common rules in the 
Union. This finding is in accordance with the assumptions of liberal 
intergovernmentalism, and those of the neorealist theories. In that, the main interest 
of states is survival. The relatively more powerful state actors do cooperate when the 
benefit from cooperation is greater than the benefit of unilateral action. Finally, 
multilateral actions in the form of cooperation are vulnerable to state interests even if 
cooperation has been going on for some time. In sum, the crisis has exposed the 
vulnerability of economic integration and financial solidarity to individual interests. It 
also has exhibited the problems of coordination and accommodation of the NMS 
within EU governance. If the EU wants to progress integration in a healthy and sound 
way, it needs to reconsider the critique of inequality, thereby the issue of solidarity 
within the Union.  
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